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Innovative ideas, development of skills and job search — these are not only the constitutive elements
in the life of a doctoral researcher but also of this dissertation. The three chapters presented in the
following apply the concept of general equilibrium to topics related to technological innovations
and labor markets. Thereby, the thesis combines strands of the industrial organization literature
with the growth literature - and includes a chapter with business cycle analysis.
The ﬁrst chapter "Explaining vacancy-unemployment volatility over the business cycle: the
role of on-the-job-search" focuses on the inﬂuence of job search by employed and unemployed
workers on the volatility of unemployment and vacancy postings over the business cycle. It is
well-known that the standard Mortensen—Pissarides matching model generates too little volatility
of the vacancy—unemployment ratio over the business cycle. The chapter investigates the role of
optimal job search by unemployed and productivity—dependent search by employed workers on the
ﬂuctuation of the labor market tightness. The main ﬁnding is that variable search allows for an
ampliﬁcation of the vacancy—unemployment volatility by a factor of two compared to the original
matching model. The model is innovative by shifting the focus towards the worker’s side instead
of the ﬁrm in generating ﬂuctuations. Preceding work has mainly focussed on wage rigidities
to increment ﬁrm proﬁt’s volatility which then translates into higher vacancy–unemployment
volatility. Here the worker’s side augments the volatility of total search eﬀort. From a modelling
perspective, the paper introduces explicitly the valuation of time as a determinant in the job
searching process.
The second chapter "Competition and Growth in a Cournot setup with imitation" analyzes the
inﬂuence of imitation costs as a proxy for competition and growth in a neo-Schumpeterian growth
model. In the traditional Schumpeterian framework, less competition implies larger proﬁts and
more innovation, which contradicts the general view of competition being performance enhancing.
In order to reproduce the empirical hump—shaped relationship between competition and growth
the model exploits the fact that incumbents need to replace themselves when innovating. In
viiviii INTRODUCTION
fact, if the current proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms are too high, they have no incentives to innovate.
Outside ﬁrms that may enter through imitation reduce these proﬁts, reestablishing in this way the
incentives for innovation. Imitation costs are chosen as measure of competition which distinguishes
the model from other setups and bears the advantage that these costs can be inﬂuenced by policy
makers either through taxes or subsidies, or through patent legislation. The model includes
heterogeneous ﬁrms, free entry and technological obsolescence as well as non—drastic innovations
combined with Cournot competition to determine prices and quantities. High imitation costs
reduce entry which increases the value of incumbent ﬁrms, but reduces also their incentives for
innovation. By lowering imitation costs increases the number of incumbents and reduces proﬁts
which in itself reduces innovation incentives (Schumpeterian eﬀect), but at the same time the
industry is shifted to a more innovative market structure as more ﬁrms engage into a race for the
next innovation (composition eﬀect). The two opposing eﬀect leads to a hump—shaped relationship
between competition and growth. Too low imitation costs imply too little proﬁts for innovation,
while too high imitation costs imply too much proﬁts for innovation.
The third chapter "Diﬀusion of technologies with skill heterogeneity and productivity incre-
ments" models technology diﬀusion focussing on the requirements of skills for the adoption of a
technology and the evolution of its productivity applied to a General Purpose Technology like
information technology. A technology is identiﬁed by two characteristics which evolve along the
diﬀusion path: minimum skill requirement and productivity level. An R&D ﬁrm owning monopoly
rights on a technology maximizes proﬁts by improving both of the characteristics. The model
unveils the complementarity of skill requirement and productivity during the maturation of a new
technology, a reduction in skill requirements increases the market size which is the more proﬁtable
the more productive the technology is and productivity enhancements have a larger return the
larger the lower the required skills for the technology. The framework yields an S-shaped diﬀusion
pattern which is the result of the complementarity between productivity and skill requirement.
No speciﬁc distributional assumption is needed for the skill distribution of the population. In
addition, applying this setup to General Purpose Technologies, provides a rationale for the ob-
served growing wage diﬀerentials — between users of the old and new technologies — as well as
for the productivity slowdown —an initial phase of reduced output growth due to increased R&D
activity.Chapter 1
On—the—job search and v—u volatility
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1.1 Introduction
The Mortensen—Pissarides matching model has become an important workhorse in the business
cycle literature to incorporate the mechanisms of the labor market. At its core the model for-
mulates a macroeconomic matching function which reﬂects the frictional and timely process for
workers and employers in forming employment relationships. In addition it includes a microeco-
nomic foundation for wage formation based on a bilateral bargain of a surplus generated by the
match, see Pissarides (1985) and Pissarides (2000) for a detailed description. But by analyzing
new data on vacancies Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005a) ﬁnd that the model fails to explain the
variability of its two main variables, unemployment and posted vacancies by employers. The
diﬀerence between the data and the calibrated version of Shimer is by an order of magnitude.
This means that contrary to its analytical appeal, the matching framework has diﬃculties in
explaining the variability of its two relevant labor market variables over the business cycle. As
main source for the lack of vacancy—unemployment variability Hall and Shimer identify insuﬃ-
cient proﬁt variability of the ﬁrm. This aﬀects directly the job—creation mechanism by the ﬁrm as
employment contracts require vacancy opening, which itself depends on future expected proﬁts
by the ﬁrm.
This new ﬁnding triggered numerous articles generating remedies to the basic model by in-
creasing ﬁrm proﬁt volatility. The attempts to reconcile the model with the data can be divided
into three interrelated categories. The ﬁrst one introduces wage rigidity within the bargaining
set of workers and employers in order to attribute the surplus volatility towards the ﬁrm instead
of dividing it in a more equal manner between workers an employers. The second category of
models formulates alternative micro—founded representations of the model’s bargaining or infor-
mational structure leading either to optimal longer—term wage contracts or an information ﬂow
from workers to employers that lead to wage smoothing. Finally, the third category, which we
pursue here as well, introduces procyclical search intensity by workers leading to higher job—ﬁlling
probabilities for open vacancies, which increases the variability of expected gains for the employer
of an open vacancy.
In order to augment the ﬁrm’s proﬁt variability the ﬁrst two solution methods alter the con-
tinuous wage renegotiation of the original model. Continuous wage negotiation leads to excessive
procyclical variability in wages and reduces the amount of proﬁts that are attributed to ﬁrms
in an upswing. By smoothing wages over the business cycle variability of proﬁts is increased
at the expense of wage variability. Therefore most of the recent literature has concentrated on1.1. INTRODUCTION 3
wage rigidity, either directly imposed as in Hall (2005) or through a diﬀerent bargaining scheme
such as the one proposed by Hall and Milgrom (2005). As a result these features do earn higher
variability of the vacancy—unemployment ratio, which has further been shown by Gertler and
Trigari (2005). But this source of variability is not suﬃcient to account for the large discrepancy
between the empirical ﬁndings vacancy—unemployment variability and the model’s predictions.
The features introduced in this paper is variable job search by unemployed and productivity—
dependent on—the—job search by employed workers. By including variable search we uncouple
the empirical labor market tightness, the vacancy—unemployment (v/u) ratio, from the model’s
relevant choice variable, vacancy—search ratio (v/s). In the original model the observable and the
model’s variable are identical, tying total search amount strictly to the number of unemployment.
By separating the two variables it is possible to have falling unemployment without necessarily re-
ducing the total search amount. This leaves the ﬁrms with larger incentives to create vacancies as
the job—ﬁlling probability remains larger. It has been shown that variable search by unemployed
or employed and productivity—independent on—the—job—search taken separately can neither gener-
ate the magnitude of volatility nor the observed impulse responses of the business cycle variables
to productivity shocks1. The intuition to this is as follows. We can subdivide changes of total
search amount into changes of per—capita search intensity, representing the intensive margin, and
changes in the composition of searchers (employed or unemployed), being the extensive margin.
Including variable search only for unemployed increases only the intensive margin. But the to-
tal number of unemployed workers is too small to generate big ﬂuctuations unless the search
variation leads to indeterminacy of the model as shown by Hashimzade and Ortigueira (2005)2.
By extending variable search also to employed workers we add a source of volatility to search
activity which creating variability on the intensive margin as well as on the extensive margin
(unemployment-employment movement) and earning higher vacancy-unemployment volatility.
In existing models of on—the—job search, such as Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) or Shimer
(2005a), the total number of job—seekers is increased by introducing variable, but identical, search
intensity for all employed workers. In such a framework workers of all productivities, low or high
productivity, search with the same intensity3. The problem is the higher rejection—rate of new
1See for this Nagypal (2004) and Krause and Lubik (2004b).
2Krause and Lubik (2004b) have determined areas of indeterminacy and non—existence for parameters of the
standard matching model.
3or in a more reﬁned version, workers search with a constant level up to a threshold productivity level, above
which they do not search at all (see Pissarides (2000))4 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
matches by high—quality workers when matched to lower productivity jobs. The rejection of
successful matches by high productivity workers decreases the eﬀective job—ﬁlling rate for ﬁrms
and hence the incentives for employers to open vacancies as the costs for opening vacancies are
wasted. Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) show that a positive productivity shock may even decrease
the eﬀective job—ﬁlling rate due to the rejection problem by employed workers, which implies that
the labor market variables become insulated to productivity shocks.
As a solution to the rejection—dilemma and to address the tightness variability problem we
therefore extend the basic model by including productivity—dependent on—the—job search in ad-
dition to variable search intensity by unemployed workers. In equilibrium we obtain that all un-
employed workers search with identical time—varying intensity, and on—the—job searchers search
dependent on the productivity with which they are currently employed. Unemployed workers
search most and accept all oﬀered jobs, while search intensity by employed workers decreases
with their match—speciﬁc productivity level, as the probability of ﬁnding better jobs decreases.
In the pool of job—searchers the probability of obtaining a better match for an employed worker
is higher the lower the current productivity. The bulk of search amount is carried out by unem-
ployed and low—productivity workers, which on the aggregate reduces the probability of a rejected
m a t c hf r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e wo ft h eﬁrm. As a consequence employers are more inclined to open
vacancies compared to the standard on—the—job model.
The model increases the variability of the empirical labor market tightness compared to the
standard model. The main reason lies in the distinction of unemployment and search amount. In
an upswing the employer has larger incentives to open new vacancies due to higher expected proﬁts
which subsequently increases job formation and reduces unemployment. In a standard matching
model the reduction in unemployment strongly counteracts the increased proﬁts for the ﬁrm as it
becomes harder to ﬁnd workers, the job—ﬁlling rate declines. With endogenous search intensity for
unemployed and on—the—job search by employed workers total search does not decrease drastically
with the formation of new employment relationships although unemployment reduces implying a
larger job—ﬁlling rate for the ﬁrm. Hence, vacancies are larger than before while unemployment
is reduced leading to a stronger volatility in the observable vacancy—unemployment ratio. In
this way the increased search amount overcomes partially the initial diﬃculty of the Mortensen—
Pissarides model.
On—the—job—search models face numerous conceptual diﬃculties, either at the level of bar-
gaining or at the level of job separations, which I address in the model. The ﬁrst one already1.1. INTRODUCTION 5
mentioned is the rejection by employed workers of lower productive jobs reducing the incentives
for ﬁrms to open vacancies. By making on—the—job search productivity dependent we are able to
reduce the importance of the rejection rate in reducing incentives to vacancy—opening. The other
three problems mentioned in the literature are outside options that depend on the employment
history, bidding races between former and future employers and higher quit rates of on—the—job
searchers.
Firstly, it might be that on—the—job searchers as opposed to unemployed searchers could
negotiate higher wages with their new employer due to the fact that they have a higher outside
option due to their current employment. For such a setup it is necessary to abandon the hypothesis
of continuous bargaining between worker and employer and adopt a speciﬁc contract at the
moment of the match formation. But this would lead to a wage formulation which depends on
the entire employment history of the individual making not only the endogenous employment
distribution but also the wage of each individualas t a t ev a r i a b l e . N e x tt ot h ef a c tt h a tw e
assume continuous re—bargaining possibilities between employer and employee we also assume
throughout the model that wage bargaining takes place only after the worker has been matched
with an employer and after the old job has been deﬁnitively quit. The worker once matched to a
new employer and after the match—speciﬁc productivity has been observed, can not return to his
former occupation. In this way both types of workers, formerly employed and unemployed, have
the same outside option, the value of being unemployed.
Secondly, higher wages for on—the—job searchers are also generated due to outbidding possi-
bilities by potential new employers. A recurrent topic in the on—the—job search literature is the
possibility of the current employer to oﬀer higher wages, similar to eﬃciency wages, to prevent
job—to—job transitions by the worker. In such a framework an employer presents a new job—match
to his current employer and asks for higher wages to in exchange for remaining on the job. With
a continuous bargaining setup there is no space these contracts would be renegotiated once the
other job has been ﬁlled by a diﬀerent job—seeker.
Finally, the search activity of employed workers leads to higher quit rates compared to a
situation without on—the—job search. As a job value for the ﬁrm consists of the per—period proﬁts
to the ﬁrm and the expected duration of the employment relationship, on—the—job search reduces
the expected proﬁts and therefore reduces the amount of opened vacancies. In general such a
situation would lead to lower wages for workers as the capital gain to the employer is lower. In
this paper we assume a that a continuum of ﬁrms exist and that each of them is characterized by a6 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
continuum of jobs. On—the-job search leads to productivity gains within the ﬁrm which increases
proﬁts for the ﬁrms. The law of large numbers leads to a situation in which each worker lost
through on—the—job search is compensated by an equally higher productive worker, beneﬁtting
the proﬁts of the ﬁrm in this way. Wages are weighted mean between the net productivity of
a job and the outside option of the worker. As the searching technology requires time and the
outside option consists of increased leisure, a higher on—the—job search intensity also increases
the outside option. In this way on—the—job search increase wages of the workers.
One issue presented by Nagypal (2005) nevertheless remains intact: on—the—job search models
predict that ﬁrms prefer to hire unemployed workers over employed workers because the expected
proﬁts upon contact of contacting unemployed workers is higher. The diﬀerence in expected
proﬁts stems from the rejection of low productivity matches by on—the—job searchers; unemployed
workers instead accept every job they become matched to. This fact clearly demonstrates that
informational ﬂows are important in the process of job matching.
Introducing productivity—dependent on—the—job search along with variable search into a fully
ﬂedged matching model signiﬁcantly augments the volatility of the vacancy—unemployment ratio.
The relative volatility to output is more than doubled compared to the basic version with constant
search only by unemployed. Nevertheless comparing the result with empirical data reveals that
endogenous search even when correctly accounting for rejections can only contribute a small part
to the variability puzzle. But combining on—the—job search with other mechanisms that directly
aﬀect proﬁts of ﬁrms may already do the job. In this way the model contradicts the ﬁnding by
Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) (section 6), and allows on—the—job search to have a signiﬁcant
role in the Mortensen-Pissarides framework.
The paper is structured as follows, the next section describes the model, its time structure,
the labor market setup , the problems of the household and the ﬁrm and wage bargaining. We
then describe the calibration strategy and computational issues. Section 1.4 presents the steady
state and the dynamic results and we conclude with section 1.5.
1.2 The model
The model presented in this paper incorporates variable search for unemployed and productivity—
dependent on—the—job search for employed workers within a Dynamic General Equilibrium model
with a Mortensen—Pissarides matching framework for the labor market. The aim is to increase
the volatility of vacancies and unemployment in order to better match the model’s predictions1.2. THE MODEL 7
w i t ht h ed a t a .T os o l v es o m eo ft h ec o n c e p t u a ld i ﬃculties regarding on—the—job search I present
the timing and the information ﬂow within a given period.
Time is discrete. At the beginning of the period workers and employers know wether they
are matched or not and know their match—speciﬁc productivity. An aggregate productivity shock
then determines the precise productivity level of the jobs. This enables workers and employers
to engage in wage negotiation or both sides decide to endogenously destroy the match in the
case the productivity does not generate a positive surplus. In this case the worker joins the
pool of unemployed and the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt. Thereafter all individuals engage in market
activity, either working and/or searching for jobs. Only after an exogenous destruction rate hits
the existing job relationships and dissolves a given fraction of them, new matches between workers
and employers form within the period. The matching probability for each individual depends on
his speciﬁc search intensity and at the moment of the match the match—speciﬁc productivity of
the new job is revealed to the worker and to the employer within the period. On—the—job searchers
decide wether to accept the new job or rejecting it by comparing their actual productivity with
the new one and by anticipating next period’s wage bargain outcome. All unemployed workers,
instead, do accept the newly formed matches in this period even though they may be lower
than current reservation productivity, because the decision to transform the match into an active
employment occurs only in the next period. With the new employment status including the
relative productivities all parties enter the new period in which an aggregate productivity shock
occurs and the new match becomes operable.
These timing assumptions, especially the fact that bargaining takes place only in the period
following the match, implies equal outside options for all workers (employed and unemployed)
and simpliﬁes the wage distribution to depend entirely on the actual productivity4.
1.2.1 Labor market
The economy is characterized by a frictional labor market. For employers and workers to become
productive, ﬁrms need to open vacancies, and employed and unemployed workers need to search
for vacant jobs. The number of employer—worker matches occurring in a given time period is
characterized by an aggregate matching function representing the matching technology. Only
with the formation of a match between a worker and a ﬁrm the match—speciﬁc productivity
4In a continuous time model with continuously renegotiated wages (no ﬁxed wage contracts), the outside option
for previously unemployed or employed workers is identical following the moment of the match. The formerly
employed can no longer return to his former job and remains therefore with outside option for unemployment.8 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
becomes known to both sides.
Search. The search amount is chosen optimally by unemployed and employed workers in every
period. All unemployed workers are ex—ante identical and therefore search with the same eﬀort,
while employed workers search depending on their current match—speciﬁc productivity. The total
search amount is the aggregation of all individuals’ search eﬀort, employed or unemployed, taking
into consideration the productivity distribution of employed workers:




The total amount of search units in period t consists of search by each unemployed worker sut
multiplied by their number ut and of a productivity—dependent search eﬀort swt(a) by employed
workers of total number nt
R ¯ a
art dGt (a),w i t hGt (a) characterizing the productivity—distribution of
workers matched to an employer in period t, nt determines the total number of matched workers,
and art reﬂects a reservation productivity below which matched workers prefer to be unemployed.
In fact, workers follow a reservation strategy: with a match—speciﬁc productivity lower than art
they prefer to be unemployed and consume a higher amount of leisure while searching for new
jobs with intensity sut.
Search technology. Searching for jobs is exclusively a time consuming activity, to capture
the timely process of job search and the non—transferability of these costs. Compared to a
pecuniary cost, this version leads to diﬀerentiated valuation of time across workers as time is not
transferrable. Employed workers who work a certain number of hours have a smaller time window
than unemployed workers and their marginal value for leisure is higher due to a concave utility
function.
The search technology is characterized by decreasing returns in search time. Equivalently,
in order to search for jobs with eﬀort sit, the individual of type i faces a convex cost structure.
Search time σit is characterized by the function
σit ≡ σ(sit), σ0(sit) > 0, σ00(sit) > 0.
In this paper we will use the parameterization
σ(sit)=gis
γi
it ,γi > 1, ∀i = u,w. (1.2)1.2. THE MODEL 9
An individual of type i searching with intensity sit during period t needs to consume σit of
her time, gi represents a scaling parameter and γi determines the convexity of the cost function.
Furthermore, we assume that the parameters gi and γi are identical for employed and unemployed
workers.






The total time dedicated to search is the amount of time spent by each unemployed multiplied by
the number of unemployed worker in addition to the time spent by employed workers weighted
by their productivity distribution.
Matching function. The matching technology follows Pissarides (1985)5 and takes the form of
a time—invariant function with constant returns to scale and decreasing returns to each of the two
factors, search eﬀort st and posted vacancies vt. We stick to the most common parameterization
and will use a Cobb-Douglas function throughout the paper in order to compare the results with
the existing literature6.









M (st,v t) is the number of workers that are matched in period t to a new employer, depending
on the aggregate amount of search and the aggregate number of vacancies, with γ being a scaling
parameter and η the elasticity of matches to the search amount. The total number of matches
can neither exceed the total number of vacancies (all open vacancies would be ﬁl l e d )n o rt h et o t a l
population, which we normalize directly to 1,i nw h i c hc a s et h ee n t i r el a b o rf o r c ew o u l de i t h e r
ﬁnd or switch job. At the moment of the match workers draw a match—speciﬁc productivity
from a time—invariant distribution which is revealed to the employee and the employer.
Job ﬁnding and ﬁlling rates. The matching function assesses the amount of matches occur-
ring in a given period depending on search eﬀort and vacancies in the respective period. The
matching probability per search unit is given by
mt = M(st,v t)/st = γ (vt/st)
1−η .
5For a detailed illustration of the matching model see Pissarides (2000).
6Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey and estimate the diﬀerent functional forms for matching functions.
They can not reject a functional form with constant returns to scale such as the Cobb—Douglas form used here.10 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
The probability for an unemployed worker to be matched to a job is the matching probability
per search unit multiplied by the search eﬀort sut of unemployed workers
fut = sutmt,( 1 . 3 )
where the search eﬀort matching probability mt is taken as given in a market solution, while
the search intensity sut is chosen optimally by the unemployed workers. Every unemployed
worker accepts the match, as the aggregate productivity is not known in the current period but
is revealed only in the next period. For a match to last longer than one period, it is necessary
that the productivity level of the job is larger than the reservation productivity in the next
period, otherwise the worker withdraws from the match preferring to search for a new job while
unemployed.
Regarding employed workers, the rate of job—to—job transitions depends on the match—speciﬁc
productivity level a of the worker for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is productivity—dependent search
eﬀort for on—the—job searchers and the second one is the probability that the new job exhibits
a lower productivity than the current one leading to a rejection of the job—oﬀer. This leads to a
rate of job—to—job transition of
fwt(a)=[ 1− Z (a)]swt(a)mt, (1.4)
where on-the-job search eﬀort swt(a) and the rejection probability Z (a), which is the exogenous
productivity distribution, depends on the productivity level a. The probability of ﬁnding matches
that have higher productivity and are hence not rejected are
R ¯ a
a z (a)da =1− Z (a),w h i c hi s
independent of the endogenous productivity distribution Gt (a). In order to compare the job
ﬁnding probabilities between unemployed and employed workers mentioned in the literature such





which depends on the exogenous as well as the endogenous productivity distribution through the
reservation productivity.
The ex—ante job ﬁlling probability for the ﬁrm depends on the amount of matches and the
number of posted vacancies. Compared to the standard literature the eﬀective job—ﬁlling rate








Gt(art) swt(a)Z (a)dGt (a)
st
)
. (1.5)1.2. THE MODEL 11
The eﬀective job—ﬁlling probability for a vacancy qt is the total number of matches M per vacancy
vt taking into account rejected job—to—job matches. The share of those search units stemming
from employed workers with productivity higher than the newly extracted productivity needs
to be subtracted from the job-ﬁlling rate. This depends on the search intensity distribution,
the exogenous productivity distributon as well as the endogenous productivity distribution. The
eﬀective job—ﬁlling probability is identical for all vacancies as the productivity of the resulting
job is not known at the moment of vacancy posting. Note that jobs with a productivity lower
than art are counted as matched although not necessarily as employment. This depends on the
aggregate productivity next period.
Job separations and job destructions. A large literature has focussed on job destruction
over the business cycle. Most prominently Davis et al. (1996), Caballero and Hammour (1994)
and den Haan et al. (2000) regard it as the main driving force in job turnover. In order to compare
the results in this paper with theirs, I compute a job destruction and a job separation rate. Job
separations occur when the employment relationship is quit either through an exogenous or an
endogenous destruction, or a job—to—job transition
sept = ρ +( 1− ρ)Gt (art)+( 1− ρ)mt
Z 1
Gt(art)
[1 − Z (a)]swt(a)dGt (a).
Total separation rate is the sum of the exogenous job—destruction rate ρ which aﬀects all jobs
independently, the endogenous separations occur to all those remaining jobs with productivity
below the reservation productivity art, and separations due to eﬀective job—to—job transitions.
The second term is due to the reservation strategy of workers and ﬁrms: with a productivity
lower than the reservation threshold art in the current period, the worker prefers to severe the
employment relationship in order to consume leisure and search while unemployed.
Job destruction, instead, is only a subset of job separations and includes the exogenous de-
struction rate as well as the jobs with too low—productivity, but does not consider the movements
due to on—the—job search
ρt = ρ +( 1− ρ)Gt (art). (1.6)
The job destruction rate ρt is composed by the exogenous rate ρ in addition to the endogenous
rate G(art) of not exogenously separated matches.
Productivity distribution. Workers and jobs are not per se characterized by a productivity
l e v e l ,o n l yw h e nm a t c h e dt h e yg e n e r a t ea ni d i o s yncratic productivity. At the moment of match-12 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
i n gw o r k e r sd r a wam a t c h — s p e c i ﬁc productivity from a time invariant productivity distribution
Z (a). Through job-destruction, job—ﬁnding and job—to—job transitions results an endogenous
time—variant productivity distribution ntGt (a) of workers matched to an employer, where nt
characterizes the total number of employed workers and Gt (a) their distribution across produc-
tivities in period t. The cumulative distribution evolves according to
nt+1Gt+1 (a)=utsutmtZ (a)+( 1− ρ)nt
Z Gt(a)
Gt(art)
dGt (˜ a) (1.7)
−(1 − ρ)nt [1 − Z (a)]mt
Z Gt(a)
Gt(art)
swt(˜ a)dGt (˜ a).
The number of workers matched to an employer with a productivity lower than a in period
t +1 , consists of unemployed workers matched with probability sutmt to an employer in the
previous period and having drawn a productivity below a from the exogenous distribution Z (a).
In addition, all those workers that were employed with a productivity larger than art and that
have not been exogenously separated with rate ρ r e m a i ni nt h ep o o lo fm a t c h e dw o r k e r s . T h e
third term identiﬁes on—the—job search. All those workers that have found a new job with higher
productivity than a quit the pool of lower—productivity workers.
To retrieve the evolution of the total number of matched workers from equation (1.7) we set
the individual productivity to the maximum level, a =¯ a, and obtain a more familiar law of
motion
nt+1 = utsutmt +( 1− ρ)[1− Gt (art)]nt, (1.8)
where the value nt characterizes the workers in a relationship with an employer and we have ρ as
rate of exogenous job destruction and G(art) as a time varying endogenous job destruction rate. It
becomes apparent that on—the—job—search has no direct inﬂuence on total employment evolution,
but only indirectly through its general equilibrium eﬀect on the reservation productivity art.I n
order to become operative in period t−1 a worker needs be matched and in addition needs to have
drawn a match—speciﬁc productivity larger than the current reservation productivity: a>a rt.
The steady state unemployment rate may be computed from the aggregate employment equa-
tion (1.8) relating job—ﬁnding and job—destruction rates (1.3) and (1.6)
uss =
ρss
fu + ρss1.2. THE MODEL 13
It is the usual relationship between job destruction and job ﬁnding when normalizing the entire
labor force to 1.
1.2.2 Households
Individuals obtain instantaneous utility from consumption and leisure. Both are time separable
to account for the secular constancy of working time and we assume a logarithmic utility function
for consumption and a CIES form for leisure for each individual i of the household
U(ct (i),l t (i)) = lnct (i)+b




where b characterizes the attributed weight to leisure and with φ =1the utility in leisure takes
also a logarithmic form.
Aggregating over all individuals and normalizing their total number to 1, the household maxi-


















subject to three constraints: a budget, an employment and a time constraint. We assume that the
household pools income of its members, such that consumption is independent of the employment
status of the individual and hence the intertemporal decisions can be dealt with at the aggregate
level. In a world of complete markets Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) have shown which assets
are needed to obtain identical result between a large unique household and the decentralized
version. Such an insurance or pooling scheme is not possible for leisure due to the nature of time,
which cannot be transferred between individuals. The intratemporal decision for the individuals
m a yl e a dt od i ﬀering levels of leisure depending on their employment status as well as their
optimal search intensity.
The household’s utility function (1.9) may be rewritten by distinguishing between employed
and unemployed workers















[lt (a) − 1]




w h e r ew eh a v et h a tut =1− nt
R ¯ a
art dGt (a) from the discussion in section 1.2.1. The household
maximizes this function subject to three constraints: budget, employment and time.14 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
Budget Constraint. The budget constraint applies to the income pooling household, but we
could also imagine a perfect risk sharing mechanism between individuals to decentralize such a
setup, as seen by Andolfatto and Merz.
Ct + It ≤ Πt + rtKt + nt
Z 1
Gt(art)
wt (a)hdGt (a) (1.10)
Variables in capital letters refer to aggregate quantities applying to the entire household. Re-
sources of the household stem from aggregate proﬁts Πt from household—owned ﬁrms, rents from
aggregate capital Kt as well as productivity—dependent wages from employed workers. On the
spending side, households use their resources for consumption and investment.7 Capital evolves
according to the law of motion
Kt+1 = It +( 1− δ)Kt, (1.11)
with next period’s aggregate capital increasing thanks to investment It but reducing through
physical depreciation with rate δ.
Time Constraint. Every individual faces a single time constraint with total time endowment
normalized to 1. This may be used for working h hours when employed, enjoy leisure lt (i) or
search for jobs σt (i).
1=h(a)+lt (i)+σt (i) (1.12)
We can subdivide individuals into employed and unemployed workers and write for individuals
of the two types:
employed : 1=h(a)+σ(swt(a)) + lt (a)
unemployed : 1=σ(sut)+lut
The ﬁrst group works h(a) of their time and has a productivity-dependent on—the—job search
time σ[swt(a)], which depends on the search intensity at the diﬀerent productivities. Within
the group of unemployed, all individuals are identical and their search time σ(sut) depends on
the search intensity sut. The conditions for the functional form for search time were discussed in
section 1.2.1.
7There is no governmental sector oﬀering any unemployment beneﬁts or collecting taxes1.2. THE MODEL 15
Labor market constraint. The labor market is characterized by frictions in the matching
process of job—seekers and vacancies. The individual takes the matching probability mt and the
probability of job destruction ρt as given. This assumption is a major diﬀerence to the social
planner solutions by Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). While the search externality in those
models is taken into consideration during optimization, we analyze a market equilibrium where
the individual does not account for the searching externality when optimizing for the search
amount.
When expressing the cumulative distribution function for Gt+1 (a) from (1.7) as a probability
distribution function gt (a), a discontinuity is present at the reservation productivity art








swt(˜ a)dGt (˜ a) − [1 − Z (a)]swt(a)gt (a)
#)
The probability density function of matched workers next period consists of three terms. The
ﬁrst term characterizes the number of unemployed workers becoming matched in period t with
probability sutmt and drawing productivity a from the exogenous distribution function Z (a).
The second term refers to the workers that have not been aﬀected by exogenous job destruction
ρ, and hence remain employed with the same productivity if their productivity is larger than the
reservation productivity ¯ art. The third term identiﬁes the eﬀects of on-the-job search activity
to the probability distribution: employment with productivity a increases due to workers being
matched into productivity a and decreases with the amount of workers currently employed with
a ﬁnding a higher productivity job with the eﬀective probability [1 − Z (a)]mtswt(a).
The distribution ntgt (a) characterizes the number of workers who are currently matched and
start working in the current period. The distribution of workers eﬀectively working diﬀers with
respect to this distribution for productivities lower than art, who are matched but do not work.




dGt (a)=nt [1 − Gt (art)]
and total measure of unemployed is
ut =1− nt [1 − Gt (art)],
which is identical to the unemployment rate.16 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
First-order conditions of the household
The household maximizes utility function (1.9) under the three constraints (1.10), (1.12), (1.13)
exposed before.8







(1 + rt+1 − δ)
¸
(1.14)
where rt+1 is the gross real interest rate, δ the depreciation rate, β the subjective discount factor
and Et the expectation operator.
The intratemporal valuation of leisure for the individuals is
ult(a)
uct = bct [lt (a)]




ut , if unemployed
(1.15)
The marginal value of leisure in consumption units depends on the level of consumption as
well the level of leisure for φ 6=0 .A n df o rφ>1, the leisure utility function is concave implying
that the marginal valuation of leisure decreases with the amount of consumed leisure.
Regarding the value of match between a worker and an employer, note that the matching
framework allows for bilateral monopolistic rents between the two sides once matched. The net
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(1.16)
This value represents the capital gain for a worker holding an employment contract with produc-
tivity a for next period net of the unemployment value. It consists of the expected discounted
ﬂow value of next period’s wage as well as the continuation value in case the working relationship
is not severed exogenously. In addition, if the job relationship is not severed the worker ﬁnds
a higher productivity job with probability mt+1swt+1 (a)[1− Z (a)] and higher expected value
Wt+1 (˜ a). The terms in the last line represent the value of an unemployed worker consisting of
the leisure gain and the expected value of employment. Wt (a) is therefore the net gain for a
worker of being employed instead of unemployed.
8The exact formulation of the household’s problem may be found in the appendix.1.2. THE MODEL 17
The worker follows a reservation wage strategy to accept a job (see Pissarides (2000) for a
discussion). The net value of employment is therefore correctly characterized by the maximum
value between the net matching value and unemployment.






The reservation productivity art, below which the worker rejects employment equalizes the value
of being employed with productivity art and the value of being unemployed:






ut − [lt (art)]
1−φ
´
= wt (art)+( 1− ρ)swt(art)mt ¯ Wt
where ¯ Wt =
R ¯ a
art z (a)Wt (a)da. The left hand side represents the sum of leisure value while
unemployed and the value of expected future employment, while the right hand side represents
the sum of wages with productivity art in addition to expected gains from on—the—job search. The
last term is new compared to other models and permits the worker to accept lower productivity—
jobs because she expects better jobs from on—the—job—search.
Search eﬀort is determined optimally for employed and unemployed workers. Workers in






= mt ¯ Wt
equates the marginal costs of searching time σ0
u (sut) evaluated in consumption units to the
expected income value of employment for a marginal search unit. For each search unit employment
occurs with probability mt. By using the intratemporal valuation of leisure (1.15) and the fact that








Wt (a)dZ (a). (1.18)
Similarly to unemployed workers, employed workers choose their productivity—dependent on-












uct = bct [lt (a)]
−φ is the value of leisure when employed with productivity a.T h es e a r c h
costs for on—the—job—search evaluated in consumption units are equalized to the expected value
gain from a higher productivity job. The valuation of leisure with a concave utility function
depends on the employment status and the productivity level while employed.18 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
1.2.3 Firms
Firms produce a homogenous output good using capital and labor. We assume a continuum of
ﬁrms of mass 1,e a c ho ﬀering a continuum of jobs. Firms open vacancies in order to meet workers
to form jobs with match—speciﬁc productivities. This productivity is not embodied in capital but
is ﬁxed for the entire duration of the match. The overall productivity of a job j in ﬁrm i depends
on the aggregate productivity level At, the idiosyncratic productivity level aij and the average
amount of capital allocated to a jobs in ﬁrm i. While the aggregate productivity is stochastic
over time, the idiosyncratic productivity is ﬁxed over the entire duration of the match. A shock
to the aggregate productivity shifts the productivity distribution of jobs, but does not aﬀect the
relative productivities of diﬀerent jobs. The capital stock within a ﬁrm is allocated uniformly
across jobs, independently of the job’s productivity and decreasing marginal products of capital
occur at the job level. Capital is rented from households and can be traded frictionless at every
point of time. These assumptions imply that the output of a job j in ﬁrm i is determined by
aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity, the capital intensity per job and hours worked.
aijAth1−αkα
t
with h being the amount of hours worked in the ﬁrm and kt ≡ Kt
nt(1−G(art)) being capital per






where we exploited the facts, that workers’ productivity is exclusively match—speciﬁc and does
not depend on worker’s or ﬁrm’s characteristics. The aggregate capital stock at the ﬁrm level
is Kit = kitnt [1 − G(art)]. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale to hours
worked and capital, and is linear in the number of workers. Average productivity per worker
therefore does not depend on the number of workers, but only on the endogenous distribution
function of productivities. The decreasing returns to capital or worked hours occur exclusively
within a single job.
The economy is characterized by a continuum of identical ﬁrms uniformly distributed on the
interval [0,1], each of which can open jobs. In the following we will therefore use the concept of
ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm.
Firms maximize the discounted stream of proﬁts by renting capital from the household sector
and opening vacancies in order to employ workers. Capital renting is done after all information1.2. THE MODEL 19
regarding the job match is known (number of matches and match—speciﬁc productivities). The
ﬁrm does not face any hold—up problem which would instead occur if the ﬁrm acquired capital
and the second hand market would be frictional. As we are focussing on a market outcome ﬁrms
take the law of motion of productivity-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n ta n dt h ee ﬀective job-ﬁlling rate qt as
given.










t − rtkt − wt (a)h
¤
ntdGt (a) − κvt
)
(1.20)
consists of the workers’ productivity of a worker net of capital and labor costs discounted with
the consumer’s Lagrange multiplier on consumption λt/λ0.P r o ﬁts of the ﬁrm are reduced by the
costs of vacancy opening κvt. The total amount of capital hired by the ﬁrm is the average capital
per worker multiplied by the number of employed workers: Kt = ktnt [1 − Gt (art)].
The evolution of labor from the point of view of the ﬁrm diﬀers to the one by the households
as ﬁrms face a job-ﬁlling probability qt which is taken as given and deﬁned by (1.5).








swt(˜ a)dGt (˜ a) − [1 − Z (a)]swt(a)gt (a)
#)
Employment density at productivity a increases with the number of vacancies ﬁlled with produc-
tivity a and the number of existing employment relationships of productivity a from last period
increased by net job—to—job transitions. It can be seen that the distribution of employment at
the ﬁrm level shifts to higher productivities due to on—the—job search. This is diﬀerent to existing
on—the—job search models with one ﬁrm— one job approaches, for which ﬁrms had no advantage
from on—the—job search.
First-order conditions of the ﬁrm
Firms maximize the discounted stream of proﬁts (1.20) subject to the law of motion of labor
(1.21) and rent capital from households.9








ad G t (a), (1.22)
9A detailed presentation of the problem may be found in the appendix.20 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
equating total hiring costs of capital per worker to the average productivity of capital. The
demand for capital is independent of total employment at the ﬁrm level, but does depend on
the productivity distribution within the ﬁrm and the reservation productivity. In this model
employment does not aﬀect the average capital per job.
A job is valuable to the ﬁrm as long as it generates proﬁts. The ﬁrm’s value of a ﬁlled job










t+1 − rt+1kt+1 − wt+1 (a)h +( 1− ρ)Jt+1 (a)
+(1− ρ)mtswt(a)
R 1







The job value consists of the discounted productivity next period net of capital and labor costs
plus the continuation value taking into consideration possible exogenous separations with rate
ρ and job transitions to higher productivities stated in the second line. The fact of using a
continuum of ﬁrms in the economy with symmetry across ﬁrms and a continuum of jobs within
each ﬁrm, leads to a situation where each on—the—job searcher ﬁnds a better job either in the own
ﬁrm or in another one. The law of large numbers makes that on—the—job—search proﬁts the own
ﬁrm due to equally incoming jobs with the speciﬁc productivity.
Similar to the worker in (1.17),t h eﬁrm follows a reservation strategy






The optimal behavior for opening vacancies leads to cost equalization of opening a vacancy κ




Jt (a)dZ (a). (1.24)
An open vacancy costs κ and is eﬀectively ﬁlled with a probability qt, leading to an average job
surplus of ¯ Jt ≡
R 1
Z(art) z (a)Jt (a)da.
The reservation strategy of the ﬁrm implies a reservation productivity level below which the
employment relationship is not proﬁtable and the ﬁrm optimally withdraws from the match.
The marginal condition for this productivity art equates the labor capital costs of the job to the
beneﬁts in form of output and capital value, including the one of a possible job—to—job transition.
wt (art)h + rtkt = artAth1−αkα
t +( 1− ρ)mtswt(art) ¯ Jt
The costs of a ﬁlled job stem from wages for a speciﬁc productivity wt (art)h and capital costs
rtkt, while the gains consist of output value artAth1−αkα
t and future higher productivity through1.2. THE MODEL 21
job—to—job transition (1 − ρ)mtswt(art) ¯ Jt. The value of the job Jt in period t is zero by deﬁnition,
as we are describing the reservation productivity, i.e. the highest productivity level for which the
employer is on the limit between proﬁts and losses to the ﬁrm. The term with the value of job—
to—job transitions is new in comparison to other models. The worker generates value to the ﬁrm
through her ambition of ﬁnding a better job in the current period with higher discounted pay—oﬀ
to the ﬁrm. In this setup the use of large numbers confers to the ﬁrm a positive externality from
the worker’s search activity, while generally the ﬁrm would incur a loss due to the severance of the
match. Therefore, the ﬁrm has stronger incentives to keep low productive jobs open and lowers
the reservation productivity compared to a model without on—the—job search.
1.2.4 Wage determination
The frictional labor market creates rents for the worker and the ﬁrm once the two parties have
matched and drawn a math—speciﬁc productivity larger than the reservation productivity. This
surplus needs to be split between the worker and the ﬁrm by a bargaining setup. The total
surplus for each job consists of the worker’s net value Wt (a) and the ﬁrm’s net value Jt (a),b o t h
reﬂecting the gain compared to the outside option of unemployment or job closure, respectively.
We stick to the most common splitting rule, the Nash—bargaining (Nash (1950)) between the







where β reﬂects the worker’s relative bargaining power in the process. The ﬁrst—order conditions
to this problem may be described by
Wt (a)=λ[Jt (a)+Wt (a)] (1.25)
This rule states that the worker obtains a constant share λ of total surplus Jt (a)+Wt (a) or al-
ternatively that (1 − λ)Wt (a)=λJt (a). From this we can recover the wage bill for the employed
worker by using the equation for the worker’s value (1.16) and the ﬁrm’s value (1.23) with the
sharing rule (1.25) we obtain the expression












ut − lt (a)
1−φ
´
+ sutmt ¯ Wt
¸
. (1.26)
Wages are a weighted average between the productivity of the worker net of capital costs and the
outside option of the worker consisting of the utility gain due to increased leisure and the expected22 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
value for a new job. Rewrite the wage by using the sharing rule (1.25) and the search intensity
by unemployed (1.18) we obtain a clear dependence of the wage from labor market conditions
mt/qt
wt (a)h = λ
µ
aAth1−αkα










ut − lt (a)
1−φ
´
The average wage or the expected wage for all employment relationships with productivity above





1.2.5 Resource constraint and closing the model
Total production can be used for consumption by households, investment and for vacancy pay-
ments by ﬁrms
Yt = Ct + It + κvt
using equation (1.11) for capital accumulation and (1.19) for the production function we have a





adGt (a)=Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + κvt, (1.27)





Aggregate productivity At evolves according a ﬁrst—order auto—regressive process with per-




a n dw ea s s u m et h a tεt ∼ N(0,σa). Written in log—form at =l o gAt:
at+1 =˜ ρat + εt+1
1.2.6 Equilibrium
The market equilibrium is deﬁn e da sa na l l o c a t i o no f{Ct,K t,s wt,s ut,a rt,h,k t,v t,n t,G t (a),u t}
and prices {rt,w t (a)} such that:1.3. CALIBRATION 23
•{ Ct,K t,s wt(a),s ut,h,a rt} solves the household problem (1.9) subject to the budget con-
straint (1.10), the time constraint (1.12), the law of motion for capital and labor (1.11) and
(1.7), respectively.
• Firms choose {kt,v t} to maximize proﬁts (1.20) subject to the employment ﬂow equation
(1.7).
• The laws of motion for the worker’s productivity distribution ntGt and the number of
unemployed workers ut,a r eg i v e nb y(1.7) and ut =1− nt.
• Markets clear. The interest rate rt equalizes capital demand by the ﬁrms and the sup-
ply of capital by households following equation (1.22) and (1.28). The aggregate resource
constraint (1.27) holds.
• Total wage payments per worker wt(a)h are determined by Nash bargaining after matches
have formed given by the sharing rule (1.25).
1.3 Calibration
The parameter calibration is subdivided into two sets, those related to the standard business cycle
values such as depreciation and discount factors, its values being relatively uncontroversial, and
a second set relating to the labor market which requires more careful analysis. The calibration
assumes a monthly timing interval, and has its empirical counterpart from 1964:1-2005:1.
The ﬁrst value in the calibration for capital accumulation is the individual monthly discount
rate β which we set to 0.9967 in order to reﬂect an annual real interest rate of r =4 %and a
monthly depreciation rate of 0.87% to match a yearly capital-output ratio of 10. The output
elasticity of capital in the production function α is set to match a long—term capital share of 36%
as found in American income data within the considered period. Note that the usual derivation
of the labor share whn/y is not valid in this model with labor market frictions because part of
the original’s labor share is used for vacancy posting.
Regarding labor market values, we distinguish between those related to leisure in the utility
function, those to the search and matching process, and those to the exogenous distributions. The
parameters b and φ in the utility function are set in order to obtain a consumption—output share of
67% as is generally assigned to consumption in the United States, and a replacement ratio of 50%.
The replacement ratio in this model without taxes or government sector represents exclusively24 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
the increased leisure by unemployed workers compared to their average employed counterparts
and does not include any pecuniary beneﬁts from unemployment beneﬁts or insurance schemes.
These values lead to a working time of roughly one—third of total time endowment, which is a
value generally used in the RBC literature and also used by Andolfatto (1996).
Regarding the calibration of parameters for the search and matching technologies, we ﬁrst
normalize the search intensity of unemployed workers without loss of generality to 110.T h i sa l s o
facilitates the comparison with the original model of exogenous search intensity by unemployed
set to unity. In order to reduce the amount of arbitrarity we set the parameters in the search
function for employed and unemployed workers to the same value, i.e. gu = gw.B yn o r m a l i z i n g
search intensity by unemployed to 1 we obtain a value of 0.16 for gu and gw, which in turn implies
that unemployed workers search roughly one sixth of their time. Similarly we employ identical
convexity of costs γu = γw =2in the search function. The value of γu = γw aﬀects the curvature
of the search function, which we ﬁx in order to obtain worker’s search intensity to be 20% of
the one by unemployed, which corresponds to 10% of worker’s search time. This value is around
the value given by Shimer (2005b) who states an eﬀective matching probability by on—the—job
searchers of 15% of the one by unemployed workers.) Quadratic costs seem plausible, and we
make sure that we do not run into indeterminacy with these values11. The convexity parameter
together with the Frisch—elasticity of labor in the utility determine the costs of the search amount
and therefore directly aﬀect the variability of search intensity over the business cycle.
For the parameters of the matching function and the wage bargaining we set a match eﬃciency
γ to lead to a monthly job—ﬁnding rate of 45% which implies an average unemployment duration
of a quarter and represents the value found by Nagypal (2004). The values for the elasticity of
vacancies η in the matching function and the bargaining power of workers λ have been strongly
discussed in the literature. The generally accepted range of values for η lies between 0.5 and
0.7. These values for the elasticity have been empirically supported by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001), while Shimer (2005a) chose 0.72, slightly above that window. The problem is that these
values in the standard matching model do not reproduce the volatility observed in the data
for vacancies and unemployment. A value for the wage bargaining of the worker λ is similarly
diﬃcult to pin down and recently Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) have chosen a very low one,
10See Krause and Lubik (2004a) for an extensive description of free parameters and parameter restrictions within
the Mortensen—Pissarides matching model.
11With smaller values for γ, indeterminacy is much more likely to arise. In order to rule out those regions we
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which means that the largest part of the match surplus is attributed to the ﬁrm. In order to
maintain comparability with other results I use the value 0.5 for the elasticity η and also for the
bargaining power λ which allows in addition for social optimality as shown by Hosios (1990). On
the ﬁrm’s side exists a vacancy opening parameter κ which is indeterminate as it appears always
in a linear combination with the number of vacancies v, but it strongly aﬀects the job—ﬁlling rate
for vacancies. Shimer (2005a) states that vacancies are on average ﬁlled within 90 days, implying
am o n t h l yj o b — ﬁlling rate of 33%.
Finally, the total destruction rate of jobs is calibrated to obtain a job duration of 2.5 years.
This implies a monthly job destruction rate of about 3.5%, which needs to be split up in an
exogenous and an endogenous part. For this I assume an exogenous monthly destruction rate
ρ of 3% and calibrate the standard deviation of the log—normal distribution of productivities to
match the remaining destruction probability. The standard deviation the standard deviation of
Z (a) is chosen in such a way that in steady state sumZ (ar) equates the necessary 0.5% required
for endogenous job—destruction. We normalize the mean of the productivity distribution roughly
to 1 and use μZ =0(it is a log—normal distribution). All parameter values and the steady state
values for other variables can be found in Table 1 of the appendix.
1.3.1 Computation
The computational diﬃculty in the model lies in the endogenous distribution of productivity—
speciﬁc matches. The entire distribution represents a state variable within the model and is
characterized by a discontinuity at the reservation productivity as may be seen in ﬁgure !!ﬁg.A n
identiﬁcation of the distribution function by its moments would capture the discontinuity only
insuﬃciently, and would not account adequately for its dynamic behavior. In order to compute
the evolution of the employment distribution I proceed by discretizing the distribution for a large
number of points on the relevant support covering the necessary range for the endogenous and
exogenous distribution.
The results regarding distributional variables are computed through numerical integration
over the interpolating points. To obtain the dynamic evolution of the system I then linearly
approximate every single interpolation point using the algorithm by Klein (2000). But this
method requires diﬀerentiability of the variables at the steady state. In our model this is not the
case at the reservation productivity ar due to the discontinuity within the endogenous distribution
Gt(a) of matched workers.26 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
To circumvent the approximation diﬃculty within the law of motion for employment (1.13) or
(1.21) around the steady state, the reservation productivity art is "smoothed out". This implies
substituting the employment decision to around the threshold level art by a logistic probabibility
function. In this way employment acceptance is no longer a binary decision above or below the
reservation productivity but is stochastic depending on the variance of the logistic probability
function.
A ni m p l i c a t i o no ft h es m o o t h i n gm e t h o di st h a ta ne m p l o y e r — w o r k e rm a t c hw i t hp o s i t i v e
surplus may be endogenously severed though it would have become productive in the original
s e t u p ,a n di nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e ,am a t c hw i t hn e gative surplus may remain operative generating
negative proﬁts for ﬁrms or being sub—optimal for unemployment workers. Although the smooth
constrained is not an exact application of economic theory, it nevertheless bears some realistic
features. Employment decisions, especially at the margin to unemployment, may be inﬂuenced
by a number of other factors including noisy signals regarding the characteristics of the job or
the employee. This is captured by the approximation proposed
The logistic distribution Λart (a) i sc h a r a c t e r i z e db yt w op a r a m e t e r s ,i t sm e a na n di t ss t a n d a r d
deviation. We choose the mean μΛ,t to be identical to art and let it move with the reservation
productivity over the business cycle. To quantify the error of the smoothing procedure we will
compare the steady state features of an exact speciﬁcation to versions with diﬀerent standard
deviations of the logistic distribution. The aim is to ﬁnd a value for σΛ which allows for reason-
able approximation results without altering the quantitative results compared to a hypothetical
thorough solution. In order to assess the quality of the approximation we present robustness
checks for three diﬀerent values in table 1.2 and a graphical presentation on the eﬀects for the
endogenous employment distribution in ﬁgure 1.2.
1.4 Results
The results for this paper shall be presented in two parts, one regarding the properties of the
non—stochastic steady state, and a second part which addresses the dynamic part in form of
impulse—response functions and relative variances compared with the data. We compare three
scenarios: the ﬁrst scenario with exogenous search by unemployed workers only, the second with
optimal search intensity by unemployed and the third one with optimal search by both unemployed
a n de m p l o y e dw o r k e r s .
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of matched workers (ﬁgure 1.1). It captures those workers that are currently matched to an em-
ployer and are able work within the match in the same period. On—the—job search inﬂuences the
characteristics of the distribution in two ways. Firstly, the endogenous distribution is shifted to
the right when compared to the exogenous productivity distribution Z (a) from which match—
speciﬁc productivities are drawn. This eﬀect increases aggregate productivity as workers climb
the productivity ladder, before being exogenously separated. Secondly, the career possibilities for
employed workers lets unemployed workers accept matches with lower productivities compared
to a situation lacking on—the—job search. The reservation productivity is therefore lower and the
support of the endogenous distribution larger.
The steady state values for search time and intensity lead to an average on—the—job search
intensity of roughly 20% compared to the search intensity by unemployed. But in terms of search
time this represents only 6% of the search time by unemployed. Unemployed workers search
14.9% of their time, which is comparable to the exogenous value assumed by Andolfatto (1996).
The average working time of workers is with 38.8% somewhat larger than the generally value of
1/3 used in the real business cycle literature.
Unemployed workers ﬁnd with a probability of 45% a new employment, while on—the—job
searchers change their occupation with an eﬀective probability of 2.74%, these take already into
consideration that roughly 7/10 of all matches are rejected by job—to—job transitioners. Fig-
ure 1.3 represents graphically job—ﬁnding probabilities for unemployed and employed workers
including the number of job—to—job transitioning workers. The diﬀerence to other models is the
productivity—dependent search intensity for employed workers. It leads to a negative relationship
between on—the—job search and idiosyncratic productivity. A worker employed with the highest
possible productivity ¯ a has no incentives to search for better jobs as these do not exist. On the
c o n t r a r yaw o r k e re m p l o y e dw i t ht h er e s e r v a t i o np r o d u c t i v i t yar has large probabilities of ﬁnding
higher productivity jobs. It is the rejection possibility of rejecting a matched job that leads to a
downward sloped relationship for on—the—job search. The pool of workers transiting to a new job
from their current employment is concentrated at low productivity levels.
The results of the dynamic analysis are made for technology shocks characterized by a monthly
persistence of ˜ ρ =0 .983 which is 95% at the quarterly time horizon. The graphs in ﬁgure 1.4 state
the impulse responses of diﬀerent variables to a one-percent increase in aggregate technology At.
The results regarding output, capital and consumption are nearly unaltered to other real—
business—cycle models, though on—the—job search ampliﬁes the eﬀects on total output slightly.28 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
The labor market variables, vacancies and unemployment diﬀer in this model to the standard
model for various reasons. To understand the mechanism it is necessary to grasp the eﬀects
on search intensity and the composition eﬀects over time. Search by unemployed workers and
employed workers increase with a positive productivity shock due to higher returns from working,
so individuals try to move into employment activity by searching more intensively. In other terms,
the intratemporal decision for the individual induces her to move to the more proﬁtable activity
between consuming leisure and searching. With higher productivity, search has become more
proﬁtable than leisure and the individual substitutes away from leisure. The shape of total search
does not only mimic the shapes of search intensities, but its curvature over time is reinforced due
to a composition eﬀect, where low productivity workers move to higher productivities and hence
the drop in total search activity is stronger than the individual search intensities of employed and
unemployed workers.
The main diﬀerence of this paper compared to other models lies in the separation of search
intensity and unemployment. Search intensity increases after a positive technology shock for
unemployed and employed workers and unemployment decreases by more than in the models
with less variable search. While the reduction in unemployed after a positive shock leads to a
reduction in total search intensity in standard models, this is no longer the case with on—the—
job search. Even more, in the model with on—the—job—search, unemployment decreases by much
more than in the other two models, and nevertheless the search eﬀort is persistently higher. When
unemployed workers enter the pool of employment they continue to search for better jobs, keeping
total search eﬀo r th i g h ,w h i c hi nt u r ne x e r t sa ne x t e r n a lity onto vacancy openings. Firms are
confronted with higher total search eﬀort from the worker’s side, which makes job openings more
proﬁtable, if the rejection rate by on—the—job searchers remains low. Thanks to the productivity—
dependent search eﬀo r ti te ﬀectively does not harm the matching process to such a degree to
reduce the movements in vacancy openings.
By combining the interplay between search variations at the extensive and intensive margin
as well as the contributions of changes in vacancies we obtain the result on the two central
variables, the theoretical and empirical labor market tightness. The theoretical tightness is the
choice variable of ﬁrms in the model and exhibits much lower persistence in the model with otjs.
But the empirically relevant ratio of vacancies to unemployment increases by more than 3% on
impact, much more than in the standard models. This is to attribute to the strong decline in
unemployment after a positive technology shock.1.5. CONCLUSION 29
Regarding the volatilities reported in table 1.3, no model is able to reproduce the empirical
values either for unemployed or vacancy volatilities. But endogenous search does augment the
volatility of labor market tightness signiﬁcantly, especially when applied to on—the—job search.
The otjs model doubles the volatility compared to a model of exogenous search. Table 1.3 presents
also a version of the model in which search by employed workers is 50% more eﬃcient than that of
unemployed. This further improves the volatilities of labor market variables, but at the expense of
unrealistic wage volatility. In fact, on—the—job search volatility is strongly linked to the volatility
of wages at the diﬀerent productivity levels and further increments it.
Finally, on—the—job search generates persistence in the correlation of vacancies to unemploy-
ment improving the ﬁt of the Beveridge curve to the data as may be seen in table 1.4 or ﬁgure
1.5.
1.5 Conclusion
The diﬃculty of the Mortensen—Pissarides model to reproduce the empirical volatility of the
two main labor market variables, unemployment and vacancies, has been revealed by Shimer
(2005a) and has triggered a vast research agenda to increase the model’s volatility generally by
increasing the volatility of ﬁrm’s proﬁts. This paper contributes to the literature from a slightly
diﬀerent angle. It includes endogenous search eﬀort by unemployed and productivity—dependent
search by employed workers and uncouples in this way search intensity from the number of
unemployed, which otherwise leads to counterfactual behavior of the vacancy—unemployment
ratio. Endogenous search indeed increases the volatility of labor market variables, but not to the
extent necessary to account for the empirical volatility. The increase in volatility is due to the
procyclical search behavior of workers. Comparing the contribution to volatility by endogenous
search with the contributions by rigid wages as in Hall (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2005) it
is apparent that directly aﬀecting ﬁrm proﬁts is more eﬀective for business cycle volatilities.
This model reopens the debate on the replacement ratio and gives it a clear economic meaning
by including explicitly time as economic variable within the search process and the valuation of
the outside option. The outside option of an unemployed worker consists of the gain in leisure
time compared to the situation when working. Clearly, the next steps are to introduce a pecuniary
insurance scheme for unemployed and introduce variable working hours for employed workers in
order to assess how the adjustment to a productivity shocks takes place: at the search margin
in order to ﬁnd better jobs or at the working margin in order to proﬁt from temporarily higher30 CHAPTER 1. ON—THE—JOB SEARCH AND V—U VOLATILITY
productivity at the current employment.
Furthermore an analysis of the role of preference shocks would be a natural continuation
combined with a theory of the allocation of time to work, search and leisure as already emphasized
by Hall (1997).Bibliography
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Description Parameter Value Calibration
Discount factor β 99.67% Annual interest rate of 4%
Depreciation rate δ 0.87% Annual capital depreciation of 10%
Capital elasticity in output α 36% Capital share K/Y of 36%
Relative weight of leisure b 1.14 Replacement rate is 50%
Elasticity of leisure φ 1.5
Workers bargaining power λ 0.5 Exogenously set
Search elast. matching fct. η 0.5 Hosios condition
Matching function eﬃciency γ 0.539 Job—ﬁnding rate for unempl.: 45%
Exog. job destruction rate ρ 3% Exog. job destr. 8.7% per quarter
Search eﬃciency gu = gw 0.149 Search intensity by unemp. su =1
search costs elasticity γu = γw 2 Quadratic search costs
vacancy posting costs κ 0.7652 Eﬀective job—ﬁlling rate 33%





Std. dev. of exog. distrib. σZ 0.2
Mean of logistic distribution μΛ = ar ar =0 .887 Steady state cut—oﬀ productivity
Std. dev. of logistic distrib. σΛ 0.001,0.02,0.05
Table 1.1: Calibration of the model’s parameters.1.A. APPENDIX 35
1.A.2 Steady state values
Values in brackets [] are used for calibration
S.S. Value
Var. σΛ =0 .001 σΛ =0 .02 σΛ =0 .05 Description (monthly calibration)
labsh 60.8% 60.6% 60.0% Labor share
capsh [36%] [36%] [36%] Capital share
c/y [67%] 69.6% 69.2% Consumption—output share
i/y 26.2% 26.2% 26.2% Investment—output share
κv / y 4.10% 4.15% 4.59% Proﬁts h a r e
rep [40%] [40%] [40%] Replacement rate
ρn 1.05% 1.47% 2.85% Endogenous job destruction
ρss 4.05% 4.47% 5.85% Total steady state job destruction rate
su [1] [1] [1] Search intensity by unemployed (normalized)
¯ sw 20.2% 19.7% 19.7% Average search intensity by employed
σu 14.9% 14.8% 14.7% Search time by unemployed
¯ σw 0.89% 0.84% 0.74% Average search time of employed
¯ σw/σu 5.97% 5.66% 5.04% Relat. search time employed to unemployed
hmed 38.8% 39.0% 39.4% Average working time
u 8.00% 8.72% 11.2% Unemployment rate
fu [45%] [45%] [45%] Job—ﬁnding rate for unemployed
fe 2.74% 2.53% 2.17% avg. eﬀective job—to—job transion
q [33%] [33%] [33%] Eﬀective Job—ﬁlling rate
rej 48.8% 48.1% 43.9% Rate of rejected vacancies (employer’s view)
reje 69.8% 71.5% 73.9% R a t eo fr e j e c t i o nb yo t js e a r c h e r s
Table 1.2: Steady State values for diﬀerent variables. Calculated with 200 gridpoints and a
standard deviation of the logistic smoothing function of 0.001, 0.02, 0.0536 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Relative standard deviations
σx/σy yc i e m p u v θ θtheo w
US data 10 .50 3.99 0.50 7.33 8.72 15.83 −− 0.47
with exogenous search 10 .37 2.89 0.047 0.71 0.93 1.56 1.56 0.94
with endogenous search 10 .37 2.89 0.093 1.39 1.07 2.27 1.47 0.89
with otjs 10 .36 2.83 0.19 2.00 1.04 2.96 0.88 1.10
with otjs (otjs more eﬃcient) 10 .36 2.76 0.13 1.81 1.47 3.21 1.13 1.15
Table 1.3: Standard deviations are from log-deviations of quarterly data to HP(1600)—ﬁltered
series. Increasing degrees of search intensity from exogenous search to on-the-job search earns
higher volatility for unemployment and vacancies.
Beveridge curve
corr(vt+i,u t) −3 −2 −1 0 123
US data −0.64 −0.82 −0.94 −0.94 −0.81 −0.61 −0.37
with exogenous search −0.69 −0.84 −0.95 −0.79 −0.35 −0.15 −0.02
with endogenous search −0.66 −0.78 −0.87 −0.64 −0.39 −0.20 −0.44
with otjs −0.56 −0.73 −0.85 −0.78 −0.56 −0.38 −0.19
Table 1.4: Beveridge curve. On-the-job search generates a more persistent negative correlation
between vacancies and unemployment.
Contemporaneous correlations with output1.A. APPENDIX 37
ρxy yc i e m pu v θ w
US data 10 .79 0.93 0.84 −0.83 0.90 0.88 0.58
with exogenous search 10 .89 0.99 0.95 −0.95 0.95 0.99 1.00
with endogenous search 10 .89 0.99 0.96 −0.96 0.85 0.99 1.00
with OTJS 10 .89 0.99 0.98 −0.98 0.93 0.98 1.00
Table 1.5: Contemporaneous correlations with output. On—the—job search increases employment
and unemployment correlations only marginally.
1.A.3 The household’s problem
Households maximize the discounted value of aggregate utility subject to the individual’s budget,
labor and time constraint. The Lagrangian and the ﬁrst order conditions are stated below
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Figure 1.1: Exogenous z(a) and endogenous gt(a) steady state productivity distribution of
matched workers. Workers matched to an employer can start working in the given period. The
endogenous distribution is shifted to the right due to on-the-job search and exhibits a kink at the
reservation productivity ar due to endogenous job-destruction decisions.1.A. APPENDIX 39




















Effects of smoothing function on endogenous productivity distribution
Distr. with sig= 10 −8
Distr. with sig= 10 −3
Distr. with sig= 10 −2
Figure 1.2: Eﬀect of "smoothing out" the employment constrained at the reservation productivity
ar by a logistic c.d.f. of diﬀerent standard deviations. With larger variance, the endogenous
productivity distribution of matched workers becomes smoother and shifts to the right. Numerical
computation is done with σΛ =1 0 −3. (left scale: matched worker distribution, right scale: logistic
distribution)40 BIBLIOGRAPHY












Job−finding rates for employed and unemployed, effective job−to−job transition
job−finding rate by unemployed (left)
job−to−job transition rate (left)
effective job−to−hjob transitions in %
endogenous productivity distribution (resized)
Figure 1.3: The job ﬁnding rates of unemployed and employed workers including the eﬀective
number (rescaled to 10^-2) of job-to-job transitioners. The bulk of transitioners is concentrated
in low-productivity jobs.1.A. APPENDIX 41
Figure 1.4: Impulse response of selected variables to a 1% positive technology shock within all
three distinct models.42 BIBLIOGRAPHY















Figure 1.5: Beveridge curve with 6 leads and lags comparing US empirical data and the three
distinct models: with exogeneous search, with endogenous search by unemployed and with on—
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Reservation strategy of workers






















Wt (a)dZ (a)=mt ¯ Wt
Search intensity by employed swt
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The equation for job-values and search intensities change slightly when "smoothing" the con-








The change occurs in the law of motion for matches:
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1.A.4 The ﬁrm’s problem
The individual ﬁrm i maximizes the discounted value of proﬁts by renting capital from the
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First—order conditions for the ﬁrm
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Reservation—productivity strategy of the ﬁrm:











Jt (a)dZ (a)= ¯ Jt
Reservation productivity art
wt (art)+rtkt = artAth1−αkα
t +( 1− ρ)mtswt(art)
Z 1
Z(art)
Jt (˜ a)dZ (˜ a)
Rewriting the F.O.C of the ﬁrm with a "smoothed" reservation productivity using the "smoothed"
law of motion for labor:1.A. APPENDIX 45
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1.A.5 Searching, matching bargaining equations
Sharing rule between worker and employer
(1 − λ)Wt (a)=λJt (a)
Bargain between workers and employers over the entire wage bill:
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σ[sit (a)] = gisit (a)
γi ,i= u,w, γi > 1
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EMPt = nt [1 − Gt (art)]
Unemployment
ut =1− nt [1 − Gt (art)]
Evolution of capital
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1.B Steady state equilibrium conditions
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2.1 Introduction
The relationship between competition and growth is a recurrent topic for growth economists and
competition authorities alike. The Schumpeterian growth literature has identiﬁed rents from
product market competition as the main incentive for innovative activities. Larger expected
proﬁts lead to larger returns of R&D investment and more innovations. This stands in stark
contrast to the interest of competition authorities to increase product market competition and
reduce ﬁrm proﬁts for the beneﬁt of consumers. This paper focuses on imitation as an essential
part of the relationship between competition and growth. To proxy competition we use imitation
costs relative to the costs of innovation and are able to reproduce the empirically found hump—
shaped relationship between competition (imitation costs) and growth.
The underlying mechanism of the model exploits the fact that entry of imitators reduces the
rents of incumbents and fosters races for new innovations. Incumbents have incentives to innovate
for future higher proﬁts due to better technology, but at the same time they need to renounce
to their current proﬁt. The fact of self-replacing itself, the so—called Arrow—eﬀect, constitutes
an obstacle for innovation incentives. The imitation of a technology reduces incumbent’s current
proﬁts, per se this reduces the incentives for future innovators, but at the same time the reduc-
tion of these proﬁts reduces also the value that is cannibalized. By reducing the incumbent’s
proﬁts, imitators both reduce incentives for innovation, but reduce also the value that needs to
be replaced. Through these two eﬀects, imitation and growth have a hump—shaped relationship.
The empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between competition and growth are abundant, but
only recently obtained clear results as they are confronted with numerous measurement problems.
Competition or innovations are diﬃcult to measure. To measure product market competition the
literature has used proﬁts either at ﬁrm or industry level, price markups (Lerner index) or the
number of ﬁrms in the industry. Obviously, these measures are not exogenous in a dynamic
framework, especially when accounting for entry and exit which make the market structures
endogenous.
The ﬁrst contribution by Blundell et al. (1995) measures innovations by “technologically
signiﬁcant and commercially important innovations” following the deﬁnitions of the Science Policy
Research Unit (SPRU). The results of the paper appear contradicting themselves. On the one
hand dominant ﬁrms in an industry (those with larger market shares) tend to innovate more, but
on the other hand more concentrated industries are less innovative. This is the ﬁrst evidence that
neither of the two corner solutions, full competition or monopoly, are optimal to foster growth.2.1. INTRODUCTION 51
More recently Aghion et al. (2005) analyzed the relationship between the price markup over
production costs, the Lerner index, as measure of competition and weighted patent citations
as measure of innovations to proxy for growth. They conclude that the relationship between
competition and growth is of inverted U shape. Their study indicates that too large or too low
proﬁts are both detrimental to growth within an industry, indicating that too high proﬁts make
ﬁrms sluggish in their R&D eﬀort and too ﬁerce competition erodes proﬁts that are a necessary
component for innovation incentives.
A third empirical study by Nickell (1996) focuses on total factor productivity instead of
using innovations or patents as proxy for growth, and use either industry—wide rents or the
number of ﬁrms as competition indicators. The results are that ﬁrm’s proﬁtability decreases with
competition but productivity of the industry increases, and in addition higher market shares
reduce the level of productivity, as opposed to the result by Blundell et al. (1995). Nickell’s
results would ﬁt best to the view that competition improves static and dynamic eﬃciency, but
the other papers tend to indicate an in—between solution, neither perfect competition nor too
concentrated markets are optimal to foster innovations and growth.
The main diﬃculty in translating empirical measures such as proﬁtl e v e l so rm a r k e ts h a r e s
to theoretical concepts of competition is the endogeneity of these measures. In this papers we
underline the beneﬁts of imitation costs to proxy competition as compared to other concepts in
the theoretical literature.
The variable is exogenous to the measures of competition in product markets, but inﬂuences
these eﬀectively. Price markups and proﬁts are determined in the model by a Cournot game,
hence dependent on the number of incumbent ﬁrms. Imitation costs act as entry barrier to the
industry, but entry itself and the number of incumbent ﬁrms are endogenous. Imitation costs
aﬀect proﬁts and entry, but their realization is determined by general equilibrium.
Furthermore, imitation costs can be inﬂuenced easily by industrial policies such as taxation,
subsidies, entry laws, patent policy or even the enforcement of patent policy as used in an extreme
form by Boldrin and Levine (2005). This stands in strong contrast to preference parameters
(see Segerstrom (1991) and Mukoyama (2003)) or parameters of product substitution such as in
Aghion et al. (1997) or Koeniger and Licandro (2006). These values alter the price markup that
producing ﬁrms can charge to their costumers (either ﬁnal good ﬁrms or consumers), which in
turn alters the proﬁtl e v e lo fﬁrms. The concept of substitutability has two main drawbacks, it
is diﬃcult to measure and it cannot be inﬂuenced by policy action. Especially when interpreting52 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
it as a preference parameter, the inﬂuence policy makers might have seems limited. In contrast,
imitation costs are at the reach of policy.
Imitation costs can be varied in a continuous way allowing to understand gradual changes
in competition. When using the switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition as a measure
to increase competition, only two single competition environments may be analyzed. In addi-
tion, the switch between the two types of interaction (prices and quantities) alters profoundly
the environment of the economy and is only feasible for symmetric ﬁrms as in the studies by
Boone (2001) and DenicolÃš and Zanchettin (2003). With heterogeneous ﬁrms, as we have here,
Bertrand competition implies that the technologically superior ﬁrm applies limit pricing which
drives the follower out of the market.
In addition to the theoretical advantages, surveys state that imitation costs do play an im-
portant role in shaping the market structure in the process of innovation, as they aﬀect the
innovation intensities of incumbents as well as the speed of imitation by outsiders. The empirical
survey by Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) ﬁnds that the majority of products in the sample have been
imitated within four years of its innovation. Regarding the costs and timing of imitation, they
ﬁnd that imitation costs are 65% of innovation costs and it takes 70% of the innovation time to
bring an imitation to the market. This is evidence for the lower costs and shorter development
times for imitations compared to innovations. Another ﬁnding in the analysis is the fact, that
the existence of patents do not preclude imitators from joining an industry, but they do increase
imitation costs as the imitator circumvents the patent legislation. Finally, Mansﬁeld et al. (1981)
ﬁnd the evidence that higher imitation costs (due to legislation, patents, etc.) lead to stronger
market concentration by creating higher hurdles for entry. We will use these facts to assess the
theoretical implications in the model. These are the facts that our model reproduces entirely.
The model in this paper is based on Mukoyama (2003) and aims to replicate the empirical
results by Aghion et al. (2005) and Blundell et al. (1995), in which ﬁrms with larger market share
invest more, but more concentrated industries generate lower innovation incentives. Intermediate
good ﬁrms compete in quantities à la Cournot and may operate with diﬀerent technologies.
The step size between technologies is ﬁxed and innovations are non—drastic, such that various
technological levels are accommodated within the same industry. Technology is sequential in
the sense that outsiders need to enter the market ﬁrst through imitation and innovate only in
a second step. Imitation reduces proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms, alters the market structure of he
industry and leads to a continuous turnaround in the industry through entry, which makes other2.1. INTRODUCTION 53
ﬁrms obsolete.
We reproduce the hump—shaped relationship between costs of imitation and growth found
by Aghion et al. (2005). Two opposing eﬀects generate the hump—shaped relationship between
competition and growth: the ﬁrst eﬀect is the well—known Schumpeterian eﬀect. Lower imitation
costs lead to higher entry into the industry reducing in this way the level of achievable proﬁts
in the industry and at the same time shortening the length of time of more concentrated indus-
tries. The direct implication is a reduction in the returns to innovation and hence of innovation
investment. The second eﬀect relates to the Arrow—eﬀect of self—replacement. Firms with high
proﬁts (monopolies) do not replace themselves in order not to destroy their own present proﬁts.
Imitation reduces these proﬁts and reestablishes the incentives for innovation for the incumbent
ﬁrms. Hence, imitation alters the market structure by increasing the number of ﬁrms in the
industry and shifts the economy to a more innovative environment. We call this the composition
eﬀect. The interplay of the composition and the Schumpeterian eﬀect leads to the hump—shaped
relationship between competition and growth. From the perspective of static eﬃciency, imita-
tion is undoubtedly good for welfare as it lowers prices, increases productive eﬃciency (industry
leaders are imitated) and augments the amount of goods being consumed. But from a dynamic
perspective the results depend on the current level of imitation.
Beyond the innovation—growth relationship the model accounts for several other regularities
in the innovation—growth literature. By allowing heterogeneous ﬁrms we ﬁnd that technologically
more advanced ﬁrms innovate more. These are also the larger ﬁrms in the industry, either mea-
sured by output or by proﬁts. Their incentives for innovations stems from the escape—competition
eﬀect, as successful innovations allows them to apply monopoly pricing, while laggards would still
ﬁnd themselves constrained by the other incumbents. As a direct consequence, leaders in an
industry remain leaders with higher probability. Regarding entry and exit, the model replicates
continuous entry through imitation and exit through technological obsolescence. In this process
higher imitation costs prolong imitation time and therefore lead to more concentrated industries,
as also found by Mansﬁeld et al. (1981).
The model inserts itself into the Neo—Schumpeterian literature with its earliest version by
Aghion and Howitt (1992). The literature focussed generally on drastic innovations, in which
an innovation replaces directly former technologies, while we address non—drastic innovations
to allow for technologically heterogeneous incumbents but with homogeneous output goods. In
the main Schumpeterian literature patents are required as incentives to pursue innovative R&D54 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
to protect post—innovation proﬁts. Abolishing the idea of patents and allowing for imitation,
Segerstrom (1991) and Mukoyama (2003), on which we base the presented model here, show
that incentives to pursue innovations still exist due to the ﬁrst—mover advantage by maintaining
technologies secret, which may be quite substantial as shown by Gort and Klepper (1982). The
main drawback of the initial models is that only outsiders replace incumbents, as these do not self—
replace themselves. We therefore allow for innovation races of incumbents and the coexistence of
ﬁrms with heterogeneous technology. To allow for heterogeneous ﬁrms in markets of homogeneous
goods it is necessary to include Cournot competition combined with non—drastic innovations,
which received only little attention in the literature. We build here on the work by Barro and
Sala-i Martin (1995) and DenicolÃš and Zanchettin (2003), but our proxy of competition is
diﬀerent from theirs.
Finally, comparing with most prominent research strand on competition and growth by Aghion
et al. (2005) we allow for entry and exit and use the threat of entry as part of measure of
competition. Faster entry decreases the rate of proﬁts (and also the Lerner index) and therefore
is an important determinant of competition. In fact, the authors themselves state that "an
important extension would be to introduce entry and entry threat as alternative measures of
competition." The entry mechanism for imitators exploited in this model may be seen as the
counterpart to step—by—step innovations proposed by Aghion et al. (1997).
The paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the model with the setups for
production in the ﬁnal and intermediate goods sector, the innovation and imitation and structure
and the household problem in a general form. Section 2.3 reduces the dimensional space of
the setup by imposing parameter restrictions and solves the model numerically. Section 2.4
relates competition to growth and unveils numerically the mechanism behind the hump—shaped
relationship. Furthermore we relate the proxy for imitation to empirical measures of competition
more commonly used in the literature.
2.2 The model
The economy consists of a an intermediate and a ﬁnal good sector following the basic Schum-
peterian literature as in Aghion and Howitt (1992). The ﬁnal good sector produces a unique
output good (numéraire) under perfect competition with a constant returns to scale technology
using labor and a composite intermediate good as input. Its output is used for consumption and
as input in the intermediate and the R&D sector.2.2. THE MODEL 55
The intermediate sector is subdivided into a continuum of industries ω [0,1].W i t h i n e a c h
industry ﬁrms produce an identical good of a given quality with diﬀerent technologies and compete
in quantities à la Cournot1. To allow for various technological levels within industries we assume
non—drastic innovations, implying that the quality gap between technological leaders and followers
is suﬃciently small not to make the ﬁrst follower obsolete. In addition, Cournot competition
prevents the technological leader from applying limit pricing as would be the case with Bertrand
competition2.
Innovations are made exclusively by incumbents, outsiders enter the market through imitation.
The number of ﬁrms in each industry is endogenously determined through free entry by imitation
and exit through obsolescence if production costs are higher than the Cournot market price. The
market structure and the relative technological position of ﬁrms evolves endogenously through
innovation races. In fact, for given parameter values which will always be fulﬁlled in the steady
state considered, monopolistically operating ﬁrms do not replace themselves, the so called Arrow
eﬀect. Imitation reduces the current proﬁts by incumbents, which removes the obstacle to their
innovation, leading to an innovation race between incumbents. Entrants imitate the technological
leader of an industry and succeed with a Poisson distributed hazard rate. Once successful, the
new entrant engages in innovation activity. Technology is therefore cumulative, building ﬁrst on
imitation to enter and then become innovative when in the market.
2.2.1 Product markets
Final good sector
The representative ﬁrm in the ﬁnal good sector uses labor L and a continuum of intermediate
goods xkt(ω), indexed by ω [0,1] and by their reference quality level k, and combines these in a







The representative ﬁrm of the ﬁnal good sector uses xkt(ω) units of intermediate goods of quality
index k(ω) from industry ω.T h eﬁnal good sector is characterized by perfect competition and
1In this way the ﬁnal sector demands a good of unique quality from the intermediate sector and the price for
the intermediate good depends exclusively on the market structure in the intermediate industry.
2In fact, with price competition à la Bertrand and non-drastic innovations the optimal strategy for the techno-
logically advanced producer is to undercut the followers’ price by applying limit ricing and drive him out of the
market. This leaves a single ﬁrm in the market, which earns positive proﬁts.56 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
the representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts by choosing labor and the intermediate good optimally.




where prices equate marginal productivity of the intermediate good p(ω)= ∂Y
∂xk(ω) (we normalized
labor L =1 ). The quantity demanded may be split into a stationary term and another one aﬀected








1−α is the part of demand independent of the technological level, but
varying with the market structure within industry ω through the Cournot price p(ω). The demand
for intermediate goods ﬂuctuates with the market price and increases with successive technological
innovations by q
α
1−α, which represents the output increment between two innovations. This
framework allows to disentangle technological factors, which grow along the balanced growth
path, from market structure eﬀects, which are stationary.
Intermediate goods sector
The intermediate goods sector is subdivided into a continuum of industries deﬁned by ω and
distributed on the support [0,1]. The intermediate good in each industry is characterized by its
quality k and produced by a number of active ﬁrms in the industry of diﬀering productivity. We
call leader the ﬁrm (or ﬁrms) with the current highest productivity and all other ﬁrms followers
as these produce with inferior technology. The technological leader is characterized by lowest
production costs, the ﬁrm of subsequent technology, the ﬁrst follower, has q times the leader’s
costs, the second follower faces q2 times the cost to produce the same good of quality k.F i n a l
product ﬁrms demand the composite good of quality index k, and production across intermediate
ﬁrms within each industry is allocated via Cournot competition. In this way we obtain a quantity
that increases with every quality step and a stationary price along the balanced growth path that
varies exclusively with market structure of the industry.
Production and Cournot competition. Technological innovations are non—drastic and ﬁrms
in each industry compete à la Cournot. These two assumptions allow for the simultaneous pres-
ence of technologically heterogeneous ﬁrms in the industry. Cournot competition is used in this
3In order to ease notation we drop the time subscript as long as it does not create confusion.2.2. THE MODEL 57
paper as it allows for gradual technological obsolescence of ﬁrms producing homogeneous goods.
Bertrand competition might seem more realistic for its price competition in a static setup, but
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) demonstrated that a sequential setup with capacity decisions in
a ﬁrst step and Bertrand competition in a second step is equivalent to Cournot competition. In
addition, in a Cournot setup proﬁts within an industry depend on the technological composition
of the industry, which allows to order industry setups by proﬁt. Instead, a Bertrand setup for ho-
mogeneous goods generates generally either a monopolistic price or limit price with monopolistic
or zero proﬁts, respectively.
For Cournot competition with heterogeneous ﬁrms to be sensible, two conditions need to
hold. First, we require α<1 for the production elasticity, otherwise intermediate ﬁrms with
linear production costs cannot generate rents. Second, the non-drastic innovation condition,
0 <α q<1, needs to hold. This ensures that minimum two ﬁrms of heterogeneous productivity
can coexist in the market and the resulting Cournot price is larger than the production costs
of the ﬁrst follower. Non—drastic innovations have been less treated in the innovation—growth
literature building on Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and Howitt (1992), but they are
suited to account for ﬁrm dynamics and gradual obsolescence.
The production costs of intermediate ﬁrms is one unit of ﬁnal goods, the numéraire, but each
ﬁrm produces a diﬀerent quality. By assuming that lower quality ﬁrms can compensate the lower
quality by higher quantity, we obtain that the leader within an industry produces a good with
quality k(ω) with unit costs, while the follower with lower quality requires q units in order to
produce a good of equivalent quality.










where P [·] characterizes the inverse demand by the ﬁnal goods sector, xk (ω) is the industry’s
total output and xs
k (ω) is output of a ﬁrm of technological level s in an industry characterized
by a state—of—the—art technology level of k(ω).T h eﬁrm’s constant marginal costs qk(ω)−s are
incurred by ﬁrm of quality s to produce a quality k(ω) good and increase with the distance to
the industry frontier quality k(ω).T h eﬁrst—order condition for proﬁt—maximization is
P [xk (ω)] + P0 [xk (ω)]xs
k (ω) − qk(ω)−s =0 , (2.5)
earning the Nash-equilibrium price of the game in quantities.58 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
Summing the ﬁrst order conditions (2.5) for all ﬁrms in an industry n(ω)=
Pk(ω)
s=0 ns(ω)
(where ns(ω) is the number of ﬁrms operating with quality s) shows that the equilibrium price
P [xk (ω)] is independent of the distribution of marginal costs across ﬁrms, but depends only on
the mean of productivities as found by Bergstrom and Varian (1985)





ns (ω)qk(ω)−s − P0 [xk (ω)]xk (ω). (2.6)
This equation simpliﬁes in our model by using the demand function for intermediate goods (2.3)
and exploiting the constant quality steps between subsequent technological levels to4








The speciﬁcation generalizes the price in a Cournot game with symmetric ﬁrms. Prices P (ω)
decrease either due to a larger number of active ﬁrms n(ω) in the market, characterized in the ﬁrst
part of the expression, or through a more productive composition of ﬁrms within the industry
represented in the second part. These two components, the inﬂuence of the number of ﬁrms
and the eﬃciency eﬀect are relevant later to determine the relative process of diﬀerent market
structures. Due to the fact that prices depend only on the relative productivities within the
industry, we observe stationary prices along the balanced growth path, while intermediate output
grows.
Innovation and imitation. Innovations are carried out exclusively by incumbent ﬁrms within
each industry and their intensity is chosen optimally by the ﬁrm in order to maximize its present
discounted value. We follow Mukoyama (2003) in modelling the innovation structure. Incumbent
ﬁrms compete in a race for the next innovation using the ﬁnal good as input. Their innova-
tive R&D activity produces spillovers from which the other ﬁrms within the industry beneﬁt,
but not potential entrants or ﬁrms in other industries. These spillovers have been empirically
tested, Spence (1984) and Cohen and Levin (1989) note in their analysis of R&D conduct that
externalities exist within industries due to labor mobility and informational exchange. An R&D
department cannot withhold workers or information perfectly. These leakages are helpful for com-
petitors in the same ﬁeld to improve their own innovative activity. The spillovers are necessary to
increase the beneﬁts of an innovation race between incumbents. The fact of entry reduces proﬁts
4This is a generalization of the industry price found by DenicolÃš and Zanchettin (2003) for an industry structure
with Cournot competition, non—drastic innovations and a single producer at every technological level.2.2. THE MODEL 59
by incumbents and would reduce innovation incentives, but thanks to the spillovers, incumbents
have higher incentives to innovate and spur growth in this way. In addition, due to spillovers
it is possible to employ linear innovation costs. In general, convex costs are used for innovation
races (see Tirole (1988) or Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995)) to generate determinate interior solu-
tions. The linear form in our presentation eases calculations to a large extent, but spillovers are
necessary to generate suﬃcient incentives for incumbents.
The hazard rate for innovations follows a memoryless Poisson process identically and inde-
pendently distributed for each ﬁrm. Incumbents face linear innovation costs, increasing with
technological level of the industry in order to generate constant innovation hazard rates in steady
state. An R&D intensity for innovation Ij by ﬁrm j requires costs of
cI [Ij,k(ω)] = q
α
1−αk(ω)aIIj, (2.8)
where aI is the innovation cost per unit and total costs grow with q
α
1−α for each increment of
the quality index k(ω). The factor is identical to the increment in output of the intermediate
sector for each successive innovation as seen in equation (2.3). The innovating ﬁrm chooses its
innovation intensity Ij in a Nash game, taking the innovation intensity of other incumbents as
given. The innovation intensity therefore maximizes the present discounted value of the ﬁrm,
argmaxIj V (·).
Thanks to the spillovers the hazard rate hj for an individual ﬁrm j within industry ω is
hj(Ij,I −j)=Ij + θI−j
and depends on the intensity Ij of the ﬁrm itself and the intensity by all other incumbents
I−j, weighted by the degree of spillovers in the industry θ (0,1). Due to the independence of
innovations between ﬁrms the rate with which a successful innovation occurs in an industry is
the sum of all ﬁrms’ hazard rates
P
j hj(Ij,I −j).
Regarding the situation of outsiders we assume that only incumbents are able to generate
innovations. Outsiders need to enter the market ﬁrst by imitating the incumbent leader and
innovates in a second step as incumbent. Innovators do not hold an explicit patent for their
technology giving imitators the possibility to copy the current state-of-the-art technology and
participate in the market. The cost structure for imitation is similar to innovation. It is linear
in the imitation eﬀort and increases with the quality level in the industry, but imitators do not
beneﬁt from the spillovers that incumbents generate.60 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
The hazard rate for a successful imitation follows a memoryless Poisson process. In order to
imitate with a hazard rate C, an imitator incurs costs of





1−αk(ω) as adjustment factor for the sophistication of the incumbent technology, aC a
technology parameter representing relative costs for imitation (copying) relative to innovation
costs aI. We require that unit costs of imitation are smaller than the unit cost of innovations,
implying 0 <a C ≤ 1. In this way we account for the fact that innovations are more costly to
generate due to the uncertainty about the direction of research as empirically found by Mansﬁeld
et al. (1981). The proxy used for competition in this paper is aC. Relative imitation costs are an
entry barrier for outsiders on the one hand, determining in this way the imitation intensity C,
but on the other hand, they ﬁxa l s ot h ev a l u eo faﬁrm in the homogeneous duopoly due to free
entry.
2.2.2 Households
The demand for ﬁnal goods is determined by the preferences of a representative household oﬀering






where ρ is the subjective discount rate and the instantaneous utility function is concave and
otherwise well-behaved. We will use a function with constant intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution u[c(t)] =
c(t)1−σ
1−σ . The household holds assets of the ﬁrms and has access to a perfectly
functioning asset market. We can therefore represent the budget constraint of the consumer as
an intertemporal budget constraint
Z ∞
0




where the left hand side denotes expenditure with r(t) the interest rate and Y (t) the amount of
ﬁnal goods purchased. The right hand side denotes discounted assets in t =0with A(0) initial
wealth,w(t) the wage rate and L the labor force (normalized to 1 in the following). Firms of the
intermediate sector are held by consumers. Their value equals the sum of all expected rents made
by the ﬁrms. No accumulation of physical capital exists.2.3. MODEL SIMPLIFICATION 61
2.3 Model simpliﬁcation
The preceding section described the general setup with innovation and imitation through free
entry and may serve to analyze entry and exit dynamics as well as cross—section distribution of
production within industries. To analyze the relationship between competition and growth and
maintain heterogeneous ﬁrms it is already suﬃcient to reduce to two diﬀerent technological levels
within each industry, easing calculations in this way. For this, we further restrict the parameter
space of the production parameter α and the technological step size q.
We reduce parameters in such a way that maximum two technological levels are active in
each industry of the intermediate sector. The price level p with maximum two distinct levels of




nk + nk−1 + α − 1
,n k =0 ,1,2 (2.11)
where nk and nk−1 are the number of ﬁrms of high and low quality respectively, and the industry
speciﬁcation ω has been dropped to ease notation. From the price equation (3.6) and the ﬁrst—
order condition in the Cournot game (2.5) we obtain the market shares σs for ﬁrms of technological





where P is the prevailing price in a given industry ω and s characterizes the technological level






where xk is total quantity demanded by ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods sector, and increasing in quality
units with each innovation by the factor q
α
1−α.P r o ﬁts for ﬁrm s can be conceptually divided into
a growth component identiﬁed by the quality index k through the increasing quantity xk and into
a stationary component identiﬁed by costs to produce quality s and the resulting market share σs
as well as by the market structure of the industry identiﬁed by the resulting price level P.P r o ﬁts
in two industries of diﬀerent quality level, but identical market structures distinguish themselves
only by a multiple of the technological step size, while the relative proﬁts between ﬁrms within
an industry are identical under the same market structure.62 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
2.3.1 Market structures
We now present the diﬀerent market structures that are possible with two technological levels
and explain that the implied parameter restrictions reduce the number of market structures to
only three.









Table 2.1: Six possible market structures when reducing the parameter space α - q to non—drastic
innovations with maximum two technological levels within an industry.
Market structure1 is a monopoly, market structure 2 is a heterogeneous duopoly with techno-
logical diﬀerence of q between ﬁrms. Market structure 3 is a homogeneous duopoly and consists
of ﬁrms with identical technology. The other market structures are characterized in a similar way
with either 3 or 4 active ﬁrms. We will show in the following that only market structures one
to three arise endogenously over time. The parameter restriction and free entry for imitators are
the two factors that lead to these results.
Within each of these market structures (except for the monopoly) innovations take place by
any of the incumbents, if this is proﬁtable. Imitators enter the industry by free entry equating
expected proﬁts to the imitation costs. Therefore imitation does not take place into recently
imitated market structures (3,4,6), but only into industries which arose from a recent innovation
(1,2,5), the single-leader markets. Free entry assures that only a single imitator enters the market
and maximum two leaders operate.5
The parameter conditions on α and q in order to allow for only two technological levels require
on the one hand non—drastic innovations, characterized by 0 <α q<1, and on the other hand
1 <α q 2.T h eﬁrst condition has been discussed before, and the second condition implies that a
leader with two technological steps to the follower actually escapes competition from the laggard
and is able to produce in a monopolistic environment because the follower’s costs are higher than
5Free entry equalizes expected proﬁts from entry to the costs of imitation. The ﬁrst imitator therefore equilzes
the costs of imitation to the expected beneﬁts of being an incumbent in the homogeneous duopoly leaving no
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the monopoly price. In addition, the condition makes the laggard producers in market structures
4 and 6 obsolete. Their production costs are higher than the Cournot price (see appendix).
Using the price equation (3.6) and these conditions leads to a price order of P1 >P 2 >P 3
(alternatively we will use notation Pm >P het >P hom). The order of prices for the diﬀerent indus-
tries calculated with equation (3.6) is determined by two eﬀects as emphasized in equation (2.7).
Firstly, more ﬁrms in the industry lower prices like in the symmetric Cournot setup, secondly, the
productivity composition of active ﬁrms inﬂuences prices. Firms with higher technology reduce
the resulting price by higher market shares within the industry. Which one of the two eﬀects is
more important, number of ﬁrms or product eﬃciency, depends on the parameters. The restric-
tion 1 <α q 2 implicitly weighs the inﬂuence from product eﬃciency stronger than the one from
the number of ﬁrms and the complete price order is P1 >P 2 >P 5 >P 6 >P 4 >P 3 (see appen-
dix). Hence, assuming 1 <α q 2 not only reduces the technological to two, but implicitly reduces
the number of feasible industry-types to a monopoly, heterogeneous duopoly and homogeneous
duopoly.
The binding conditions for the numerical exercise in the paper are the non—drastic innovations
αq < 1, the possibility to escape competition 1 <α q 2 and the condition on no self—replacement:
πm (g − 1) <a I[r + Cm (1 − aC (g − 1))].
In order to understand how the interplay of innovation and imitation changes an industry’s
market structure, table 2.2 resumes the transition probabilities between the three relevant market
structures (monopoly, heterogeneous and homogeneous duopoly).
From\To monopoly heterogeneous duopoly homogeneous duopoly
monop. 1 − Cm 0 Cm
het. duop. Ihet1 + θIhet2 1 − Chet − (Ihet1 + θIhet2) Chet
hom. duop. 0 (1 + θ)(Ihom1 + Ihom2) 1 − (1 + θ)(Ihom1 + Ihom2)
Table 2.2: Transition matrix for the three diﬀerent market structures, monopoly, homogeneous
duopoly and heterogeneous duopoly. E.g. the probability to switch from a monopoly to homoge-
neous duopoly occurs with rate Cm, the imitation intensity into monopolistic market structures.
Note that an innovation by the follower in a heterogeneous duopoly keeps the market structure
unchanged, but increments the technological level of the industry.
The transition matrix represents the probability of an industry to move from a given market
structure (on the left) to an alternative structure (top). Ii and Ci deﬁne innovative and imitative64 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
eﬀort respectively, while θ is the intra-industry spillover for innovations. Assuming that the
market structure is monopolistic, the industry becomes imitated with probability Cm or otherwise
the market structure remains unchanged.6 In the heterogeneous duopoly either the leader or the
follower may innovate. If the leader succeeds in an innovation due to his own eﬀort and the
spillovers from the competitor, the industry becomes monopolistic, while if the follower succeeds,
the market structure remains unchanged with inverted relative positions of the two ﬁrms and a
higher quality level k. A further possibility in the heterogeneous duopoly is the imitation of the
leader with probability Chet which leads to two leaders. The laggard ﬁrm exits the market because
the production costs exceed the Cournot price, which makes the industry become a homogeneous
duopoly.
Once in a homogeneous duopoly either one of the two incumbent ﬁrms is able to innovate.
Such an innovation changes the market structure into a heterogeneous duopoly with higher tech-
nological level. Recall, due to free entry only a single imitation takes place and the homogeneous
duopoly accommodates no third ﬁrm as expected proﬁts for entrants have been driven to zero
with the ﬁrst imitation.
Every innovation leads to a production with higher quality level generating higher proﬁts
for the new ﬁrms, whereas imitation leads to a lowering of incumbents’ proﬁts through a more
eﬃcient market structure.
2.3.2 Value functions & optimal ﬁrm behavior
We describe the value of ﬁrms in the three diﬀerent market structures (monopoly, homogeneous
and heterogeneous duopoly) by a value function, which includes current proﬁts and expected
future proﬁts weighted by their probability. In addition, we directly present the values in eﬃciency
terms, i.e. corrected for the quality level. This is possible as proﬁts, imitation and innovation
costs all increase by the same factor q
α
1−α with each innovation step. The index ω will be used
to alternatively describe an industry or a market structure but the distinction is clariﬁed in the
text stating market structure ω or industry ω in case ambiguity arises. The value functions for
the ﬁrms in the diﬀerent market structures are
6We exclude the possibility of self—replacement by the single producer by chosing parameters in such a way
that the Arrow eﬀect of self—replacement is suﬃciently large and the leader reduces its value by engaging in R&D





πhet1 + ChetVhom +( Ihet1 + θIhet2)gVm +( I22 + θI21)gVhet2 − aIIhet1
r + Chet +( 1+θ)(Ihet1 + Ihet2)
(2.14)
Vhet2 =
πhet2 +( Ihet2 + θIhet1)gVhet1 − aIIhet2
r + Chet +( 1+θ)(Ihet1 + Ihet2)
Vhom =
πhom +( Ihomj + θIhom,−j)gVhet1 +( Ihom,−j + θIhom,j)gVhet2 − aIIhomj
r +( 1+θ)(Ihom,j + Ihom,−j)
Vm characterizes the present discounted value of a monopolistic ﬁrm which makes monopolistic
proﬁts πm until imitated with probability Cm and ﬁnds itself in the market structure of homoge-
neous duopolies with value Vhom. The parameters are chosen in such a way that monopolists do
not self-replace themselves. The discount factor is the interest rate r (constant in steady state)
increased by the hazard rate for an imitation Cm. The structure of the other value functions for
the individual ﬁrms are similar. The value for the leader in a heterogeneous duopoly (Vhet1)e a r n s
proﬁts until he becomes either imitated, whereafter the ﬁrm would be in a homogeneous duopoly,
or innovates himself and operates as a monopolist by escaping competition, or the incumbent
competitor innovates and the ﬁrm operates as a follower in a heterogeneous duopoly. Regarding
the homogeneous duopoly we distinguish the two individual ﬁrms by j in order to account for
the Nash game in the innovation race, although their value Vhom is identical. The probability for
a change in market structure depends on the degree of spillovers between incumbent ﬁrms. Each
innovation leads to an increase in the value by g = q
α
1−α due to the technological advance, while
imitations imply no technological beneﬁts.
Incumbent ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by competing in quantities in the product market, and by
choosing optimal innovation eﬀort Ii in the race for new innovations. The two levels of competition
are distinct, one at the intratemporal level representing product market competition, the second
at the intertemporal level in form of an innovation race. Firms therefore maximize their value in
equation (2.14) with respect to innovative activity and then act optimally in the static Cournot
game.
The innovation race is a Nash game in which incumbent ﬁrms choose the innovation inten-
sity that maximizes their value, argmaxIj Vω, taking as given the innovation intensity by their
competitors I−j and imitation activity Cω by potential entrants.
The outcome of the Nash game, the reaction functions of the individual ﬁrms to their rival
incumbent’s strategy are66 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
Ihet1 =
(Chet + r)(gVhet1 − aI) − (1 + θ)πhet2
(1 + θ)(aI − (1 − θ)gVhet1)
(2.15)
Ihet2 =
(Chet + r)(gVm + θgVhet2 − aI) − (1 + θ)(ChetVhom + πhet1)
(1 + θ)(aI − (1 − θ)g(Vm − Vhet2)
(2.16)
Ihom =
r(gVhet1 + θgVhet2 − aI) − (1 + θ)πhom
(1 + θ)(aI − (1 − θ)g(Vhet1 − Vhet2)
(2.17)
with g ≡ q
α
1−α for simpliﬁcation. The resulting innovation intensities are for each individual ﬁrm
and are the outcome of the simultaneous Nash game for innovations between the two incumbent
ﬁrms.
Free entry
Outsiders have free entry into the industry by imitating the most advanced incumbent. An
imitation leads to a homogeneous duopoly independently of which market structure of the two
single leader markets is imitated. Free entry implies that the present discounted value of a ﬁrm
in the homogeneous duopoly is equated to the imitation costs incurred when entering the market.
Due to the fact that no further rents are possible, an industry is only imitated once, leading to
market structures with maximum two leaders. The success for an imitation is Poisson distributed
with parameter C,r e ﬂecting the imitation intensity. Due to the linear costs for imitation, marginal
costs aCaI are constant and equate ﬁrm value Vhom,
Vhom = aCaI. (2.18)
Outsiders imitate the monopolist or the leader in a heterogeneous duopoly with identical intensity.
The imitation intensity depends entirely on the market structure a ﬁrm faces when it successfully
imitates,which is the homogeneous duopoly. Using the free entry condition (2.18) combined with
the identity of imitation intensities Cm = Chet and the innovation intensities (2.15)-(2.17),t h e
value functions (2.14) can be solved for as functions of the model’s parameters.
Vm =
aI(1 + g + θ)(1 + θ + gθ)+aC(1 + θ)[1 + θ
¡
2 − g2 + θ
¢
]
g2 (1 + θ + gθ)
Vhet1 =
1+θ + gθ + aC(1 + θ)2
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The value of ﬁrms in the diﬀerent market structures is independent of instantaneous proﬁts πi.
This is due to the linear cost function of the innovative and imitative activity which absorb all
proﬁts. Firm values are therefore determined by structural parameters of the innovation process,
aI,a C,θand the quality increment g ≡ q
α
1−α. The higher imitation or innovation costs, the more
valuable incumbent ﬁrms are, which is the inﬂuence of the general equilibrium structure of the
model.
The ﬁrst—order conditions combined with the free entry conditions permitted to identify the
innovation intensities of ﬁrms in the duopolies and the intensity for copying a monopolistic ﬁrm.
The setup does not pin down the intensity with which a leader in a heterogeneous duopoly is
imitated. We will therefore analyze the results for diﬀerent values.
2.3.3 Resource constraint
Labor is used for production of ﬁnal goods, whereas the ﬁnal good is used for consumption, inno-
vation, imitation and intermediate good production. Output of intermediate industries increases
through each innovation with a step size of q
α
1−α (conditioning for identical market structures).
The ﬁnal good production (2.1) requires intermediate goods from every industry, hence aggregat-
ing over industries leads to a distribution of technological levels across intermediate sectors which
we summarize by the index Q. This index increases by the measure q
α
1−α if an innovation has
taken place in every industry. To analyze the steady state, we employ output in eﬃciency terms
Ye, which aggregates output in eﬃciency terms from all intermediate sectors (see also Barro and














1−α is the economy—wide quality index. It consists of the distribution
of the state—of—the—art quality levels across all intermediate industries. The resource constraint
for the ﬁnal good in eﬃciency terms is
Ye = ce + xe + cIe + cCe.
The use of output in eﬃciency units is subdivided into consumption ce, the production of in-
termediate goods xe, and to cover innovation and imitation, cIe and cCe, respectively. In more
detail, when subdividing the use into the three diﬀerent market structures we have68 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
Ye = ce +
αm(xe1 + aCaIC)+
αhet [(σhet1 + qσhet2)xe2 + aI(Ihet1 + Ihet2)+aCaIC]+ (2.19)
αhom(xe3 +2 Ihom),
where αm, αhet, αhom are the shares of industries operating with the respective market structures
and the bracketed terms express the use of intermediates in the three diﬀerent industries. Final
output is used for consumption, for production and imitation in a monopoly, production, imitation
and imitation in a heterogeneous duopoly and for production and imitation in a homogeneous
duopoly.
2.3.4 Steady State Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy is deﬁned by the utility maximization of households (2.9) subject
to their budget constraint (2.10). Final output ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts by using (2.1) and
demanding labor and intermediate input goods while taking prices as given. Intermediate ﬁrms
maximize their per period proﬁts by choosing the supplied quantity optimally in a Cournot
game (2.4) and choose the innovation intensity to maximize their present discounted value (2.14),
expressed by (2.15)—(2.16). Free entry through imitation is determined by condition (2.18).
Finally the resource constraint (2.19) holds.
In order to obtain constant growth rates for the economy, we require additionally a steady state
condition. Innovations and imitations in the intermediate industries occur at random moments
in time. A steady state equilibrium requires that the share of industries of a given market share
remains constant. Due to the continuum of intermediate industries we can apply the law of large
numbers and require that the share of industries switching from a given market structure to
another one be exactly replaced by switches from other market structures to the given one. If
a given number of industries operating monopolistically become imitated in the time period dt,
switching hence to a homogeneous duopoly, the same number of industries is required to switch
from the heterogeneous duopoly to a monopoly. Characterizing by αm,α het,α hom the share
of industries operating as monopoly, heterogeneous or homogeneous duopoly, the steady state2.3. MODEL SIMPLIFICATION 69
conditions may be written as
monopoly: αmC = αhet (Ihet1 + θIhet2)
heterog. duop.: αhet [(Ihet1 + θIhet2)+C]=αhom2(1 + θ)Ihom (2.20)
homog. duop.: αhom2(1 + θ)Ihom =( αm + αhet)C
The left hand side characterizes the exit from the respective market structure and the right hand
side characterizes entry into it for any given small time window. Note that the innovation by a
follower in the heterogeneous duopoly changes the technological level of the industry, but not the
market structure. In addition to the steady state conditions (2.20) we have that all shares of the
diﬀerent market structures sum up to
1=αm + αhet + αhom.
The steady state fractions of prevailing market structures in a stationary equilibrium depend
exclusively on the relative innovation and imitation eﬀort combined with the degree of spillovers
for innovations between ﬁrms.
Their exact form can be found in the appendix, but the inﬂuence of innovation and imitation
on steady state market shares is listed in table 2.3. Obviously, the levels of innovation and
imitation themselves are not exogenous, but their eﬀects in a partial equilibrium style help to
understand the economic mechanism.
Ihet1 Ihet2 Ihom Cθ
αm +++ — +
αhet ——+ ±±
αhom 00— + —
Table 2.3: The eﬀects of innovation I, imitation C and spillovers θ onto the share of industries
operating in the three diﬀerent market structures (monopoly, homogeneous and heterogeneous
duopoly).
An increase in R&D eﬀort by the leader in the heterogeneous duopoly (Ihet1) leads to a higher
share of monopolies and reduces the share of heterogeneous duopolies and leaves the share of
homogeneous duopolies unchanged. An increase in the innovation activity by the follower Ihet270 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
has a similar eﬀect. The new issue in this paper is the fact that imitation represented by the R&D
activity C shifts the market structure towards homogeneous duopolies, which are the innovative
market structures, while the eﬀect on the heterogeneous duopoly is ambiguous, and depends on
the level of innovation and imitation, as we will see in the numerical results. Imitation inﬂuences
the composition of the economy’s market structure and tilts it towards the innovative structures,
away from monopolies (composition eﬀect). On the other hand, the value function indicate
that imitation reduces the value of monopolies and ﬁrms in the heterogeneous market structure
through by increasing the discount factor (Schumpeterian eﬀect), equation (2.14).T h en u m e r i c a l
exercise shall deliver the quantitative importance of these two eﬀects. Finally, the spillover favors
innovation and hence the occurrence of more concentrated industries towards monopolies
2.3.5 Growth of the economy
In the preceding sections we identiﬁed that the increase in intermediate output (equation (2.3))
for subsequent quality levels with identical market structure is q
α
1−α . The increment for proﬁts is
identical to this factor as may be derived from (2.4), as well as innovation and imitation costs. To
obtain the growth rate of the economy we exploit the characteristics of the Poisson distribution
for the irregular occurrences of imitation and innovation. The growth rate of the economy is the
share of a given market structure multiplied by the probability of an imitation or innovation and
taking into account the output increment due to technological step and the price change




































Equation (2.21) states the steady state growth rate of ﬁnal goods, which is identical to the growth
rate of the intermediate good, as may be derived from (2.1). The growth rate composes itself of
the sum of output increments for every industry structure, weighted by the shares of industries
operating in a given market structure. Output of each industry changes through two diﬀerent2.4. COMPETITION AND GROWTH 71
sources, prices and technology eﬀects. The ﬁrst line states the output increases due to imitation.
T h e s ea r ep u r ep r i c ee ﬀects representing static improvements as imitators enter the market of
monopolies and heterogeneous duopolies. Due to the price decline by the extra competitor in
the market, the Cournot price is lower in the new market structure and output is larger. The
second source of growth is innovation in the industries currently operating duopolistically. Their
contribution is a mix of the technological improvement and the price change. Innovations lead
to a higher quality level, expanding intermediate good production in this way, but may lead
to less ﬁrms in their market or a more unfavorable technological composition which oﬀset the
technological advantages due to price increases.
2.4 Competition and Growth
Competition is diﬃcult to deﬁne. Variables used in the literature to measure competition have
been ﬁrm or industry proﬁts, the number of ﬁrms, switches from Bertrand to Cournot compe-
tition, the Lerner index relating proﬁts to marginal cots, entry barriers and others. It is even
more diﬃcult to translate these measures into theoretical concepts which have an inﬂuence on
competition without determining the endogenous outcome too closely. The main interest of this
paper is to reproduce the empirically found hump shaped relationship between competition and
growth using as unique proxy for competition in the model entry costs in form of imitation costs,
aC.
In fact, the relative imitation costs aﬀect the imitation intensity, which in turn aﬀects the share
of duopolies in the economy as seen from table 2.3, which themselves are the market structure
that permit innovation to take place. In addition to this direct eﬀect, aC has a general equilibrium
eﬀect through free entry, it ﬁxes the value of ﬁrms in the homogeneous duopoly and the value
of ﬁrms in the market. The general equilibrium is an important extension compared to other
models such as Aghion et al. (2006) dealing with entry threat in a partial equilibrium manner.
The advantage of imitation costs lies in the factt h a ti ti sm e a s u r a b l e( a l t h o u g hi m p e r f e c t l y )
and can be used within as a model parameter for competition without aﬀecting the outcome in
a trivial way. Also, industrial policy can directly inﬂuence its value, either ﬁnancially through
subsidies or taxes, entry barriers to industries or even patent policies. In fact, the degree of patent
protection would have a direct eﬀect on the imitation costs with stricter patent protection forcing
imitators to circumvent existing patents which necessarily increases their costs as described in
Mansﬁeld et al. (1981).72 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
In this paper we concentrate on the costs of imitation relative to innovation costs captured by
aC and we show how it translates to economy—wide proﬁts and the average number of ﬁrms per
industry. The reference values for the numerical exercise is characterized by the values in table
2.4 and uses an annual time horizon.
Param Value
r 0.07 Interest rate/ rate of time preference
α 0.75 Production elasticity
q 1.15 Quality step size between innov.
θ 0.5 Innovation spillovers
aI 0.3 Innovation costs
Table 2.4: Reference parameters for the numerical exercise.
The example values are chosen to reﬂect some empirical values without being a strict calibra-
tion. Interest rates are set to 7%, the production elasticity gives is set to 0.75 and two subsequent
technologies have 15% diﬀerence in quality, which earns an output increase of g = q
α
1−α =1 .52
between innovations. Although this might seem big, it is nevertheless a non—drastic innovation
step size. Regarding θ and aI, they are chosen in order to obtain positive innovation and imitation
intensities as well as positive market shares for the three market structures. The innovation cost
aI reﬂects 9 years of monopoly proﬁts.
We choose aC =0 .7 in order to describe a steady state economy with its market shares,
innovation and imitation intensities and its growth rate.
With the parameter values of table 2.4 the market structure with the largest share in the
economy is the monopoly, followed by the homogeneous duopoly. Note that the general evolu-
tion of market structure is from monopoly to homogeneous duopolies through imitation and then
through innovations back to monopolies. Analyzing the diﬀerent intensities of innovation and
imitation clariﬁes that especially the leader in the heterogeneous duopoly escapes from that mar-
ket structure shifting steady state market structures towards a monopolistic one. The innovation











Table 2.5: Steady state values for diﬀerent variables using the refernce parameters and an imita-
tion cost ac=0.7
larger than the innovative intensity in the homogeneous duopoly. This slightly alters the result
found by Aghion et al. (1997), in which the situation of neck-to-neck generates largest innovative
incentives, while a leader—follower structure is less conducive to innovation. But their model does
not allow for entry and exit and therefore does not permit a leader to escape competition from
the follower altogether.
2.4.1 The costs of imitation as proxy for competition
This model uses imitation costs as proxy for competition. We use the relative price of imitation
to innovation to identify the ease of entry. In this way we do not directly alter the general entry
costs for ﬁrms but only the part aﬀecting imitation. Note that the imitation costs ﬁxt h ev a l u e
of the homogeneous duopoly in the general equilibrium and therefore aﬀects the value of ﬁrms.
This is diﬀerent to models of entry threat that take a partial equilibrium, without taking into
account that free entry aﬀects the value of ﬁrms in all market structures.
Figure 2.1 presents the relationship between imitation costs relative to innovation costs and
the growth rate of the economy in percentage points. The ﬁgure represents a hump—shaped
relationship between competition expressed as costs of imitation and growth in the economy
(higher imitation costs represent lower competition). The graph plots the parameter space for
which innovations, the shares of the three market structures are positive, i.e. αm,α het,α hom > 0
and innovation and imitation rates are positive Ihet1,I het2,I hom,C >0. The dotted part on the74 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION








Figure 2.1: Relationship between imitation costs relative to innovation costs and growth. The
dotted line, marks an area, where optimal innovation intensities of laggards in the heterogeneous
duopoly would be negative.
left is stated for completeness, in that area the optimal innovation intensity by the follower (Ihet)
in a heterogeneous duopoly is negative.
This graph reﬂects the empiircal ﬁndings by Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1995) and more
recently Aghion et al. (2005). Low competition through higher imitation costs and implicitly
lower imitation leads to lower growth rates, while too ﬁerce competition due to low entry barriers
also decreases growth. Imitation costs generate two diﬀerent contemporaneous eﬀects on the
innovation process, the Schumpeterian eﬀect and a composition eﬀect.
In order to better understand the mechanisms with which the hump—shaped relationship is
generated, we present ﬁgures 2.2 and 2.3 which plot the innovation and imitation intensities and
the shares of the diﬀerent market structures, respectively. The levels of innovation by ﬁrms in
diﬀerent market structures varies strongly. The leader in a heterogeneous duopoly is by far the
strongest innovator, which is due to the possibility to escape competition altogether by becoming
a monopolist. For the rest, innovation and imitation exhibit roughly the same magnitude. The
eﬀect of imitation costs on innovation intensities is positive, while it is negative on imitation
intensity C. With higher costs of imitation, less imitation takes place and the incentives for
innovation increase. This is exactly the Schumpeter eﬀect.
The composition eﬀect which counteracts the Schumpeterian eﬀect establishes that with less
competition due to higher imitation costs the economy consists mainly of monopolists which is a2.4. COMPETITION AND GROWTH 75
























Figure 2.3: Eﬀect of imitation costs $a_{C_{r}}$ on innovation and imitation intensity for the
ﬁrms in the duopolies and for imitators into the monopolistic structure.
Regarding the three market shares, most changes with respect to variations in imitation costs
occur for the monopoly and the homogeneous duopoly. Higher imitation costs increases the share
of monopolies at the expense of homogeneous duopolies. This is the composition eﬀect. The
larger imitation costs reduce imitation incentives (as seen in ﬁgure 2.2) and consequently lower
entry which reduces the share of homogeneous duopolies, while at the same time innovation
intensities increase and market structures shift towards monopolies in steady state. From ﬁgure76 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
2.3 it becomes clear that heterogeneous duopolies serve only as an intermediate step, but their role
reﬂects well the hump—shaped relationship for growth. Higher imitation costs intensify at ﬁrst
innovation of homogeneous duopolies which lead to heterogeneous duopolies. As imitation costs
increase further, the innovative R&D activity permits the leader in these duopolies to become
a monopolist, while at the same time imitation intensity decreases and the predominant market
structure becomes monopolistic.
The costs of imitation have opposing eﬀects on innovation activity and on the share of
duopolies. While innovation intensity increases with aC, the share of duopolies decreases due
to lower imitation intensity. These two oﬀsetting eﬀects, the Schumpeter eﬀect and the compo-
sition eﬀect, generate the hump—shape relationship between imitation costs and growth.
Relating to other measures of competition
In order to relate our ﬁndings to measures of competition used in the empirical literature ﬁgures
2.4 and 2.5 relate growth to the average economy—wide Lerner index and the mean number of ﬁrms
per industry.Figure 2.4 draws the relationship between growth and product market competition











Figure 2.4: Hump—shaped relationship between average Lerner index per ﬁrm and the steady
state growth rate. Higher competition is represented on the left. The numerical values given in
the graph for diﬀerent points are the relative imitation costs. The numerical values used for the
calibration are given in table 2.4.
using the Lerner index7. This is the result in the paper by Aghion et al. (2005). Our model with
imitation costs can reproduce their ﬁndings by oﬀe r i n gad i ﬀerent mechanism. Competition is
7The Lerner index is the most widely used index to assess competition. It is a measure of price markup relative
to production costs.2.5. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 77











Figure 2.5: Hump—shaped relationship between average number of ﬁrms per industry and the
steady state growth rate. The numerical values taken are given in table 2.4.
now measured by the Lerner index, which is an endogenous outcome of the model. The Lerner
index is proportional to imitation costs (stated in the graph) and therefore exhibits a similar
pattern (but not identical) of a hump—shaped relationship. The higher imitation costs, the more
monopolies develop which exhibit a larger markup than duopolies. Similarly, if we used the
average proﬁts over sales or over production leaves the competition—growth relationship would
remain unchanged.
Alternatively we take the average number of ﬁrms per industry (obviously limited between 1
and 2) as measure of competition and obtain the hump—shaped relationship.
Figure 2.5 states how an increase in the number of ﬁrms relates to growth. An initial increase of
the average number from pure monopolists to duopolists ﬁrst increases growth and then reduces
it again. The number of ﬁrms is endogenous, such that no direct causal relationship can be
established between the number of ﬁrms and growth. Only through the imitation mechanism
and the variation in imitation costs one can interpret the link. In addition, the number of ﬁrms
does not reﬂect in what technological relationship they stand (homogeneous or heterogeneous
duopoly).
2.5 Conclusion and further research
This paper has addressed the relationship between competition and growth in a Schumpeterian
framework with Cournot competition and free entry by imitation. It uses imitation costs relative
to innovation costs as proxy for competition. In this way the main focus of competition lies on78 CHAPTER 2. IMITATION AND COMPETITION
the entry eﬀect of outsiders instead of the static interaction in product markets, which has been
ﬁxed to Cournot competition. The model is able to reproduce the hump—shaped relationship
between competition and growth found by diﬀerent empirical studies. The model incorporates
two eﬀects when varying imitation costs. On the one hand, lower imitation costs ease entry and
reduce the expected returns of an innovation. On the other hand entry reduces actual proﬁts
by incumbent ﬁrms which increases their net return to innovative R&D because the value that
needs to be self—replaced reduces. In addition, imitation leads to more ﬁrms in the market
that generate spillovers for the other ﬁrms fostering growth in this way. The interplay of the
two eﬀects, the Schumpeterian and the composition eﬀect, lead to a hump—shaped relationship
between competition and growth.
The model includes free entry, allows for continuous ﬁrm dynamics and endogenous exit
due to technological obsolescence. The linear setup with innovation spillovers permits a relatively
simple presentation but reduces strongly the feasible parameter space. The numerical calculations
obtain furthermore that in heterogeneous duopolies the leader innovates substantially more to
obtain monopolistic rents, which is diﬀerent to other competition—growth models. By comparing
the incentives for a laggard and a leading ﬁrm, the leading ﬁrm beneﬁts strongly from escaping
competition altogether and becoming a monopolist through a single innovation, while the laggard
would need to innovate twice to escape competition which is relatively costly. This result seems
surprising as the replacement value for the leading ﬁrm is higher than for the follower. In this
model, imitation and innovation are substitutes to each other when changing imitation costs
reﬂecting the trade oﬀ between entry barrier and Schumpeterian eﬀect.
An important path for continuation would be the analysis of competition over the product
cycle, from possibly large quality improvements in the early phase of a technology to smaller and
smaller steps. The framework presented here may be extended to account for a larger number of
ﬁrms within each industry to generate complex ﬁrm dynamics and shed light on the shake—out
phenomenon that accompanies most industry evolutions.Bibliography
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Parameter restrictions




The price for two heterogeneous ﬁrms in the market is P2 and the costs of the leader is 1
while q for the follower. In order to have minimum two ﬁrms of diﬀerent quality in the market









A leader in a heterogeneous duopoly becomes a monopolist once he successfully innovates.
This is equivalent to the fact that two quality steps are suﬃc i e n tt om a k et h ef o l l o w e ro b s o l e t e .
































In order to reduce the market structures to only three, we need to show that market structures
with prices P4,P 5 and P6 are not feasible. The condition for this is q> 2
1+α. Regarding market















Regarding market structure 5, it can only evolve from either market 4 or 6, which themselves
are not feasible. The ﬁn a lo r d e r i n go fp r i c e si st h e n
Comparison under condition
P1 >P 2 1 >α q
P2 >P 5 1 >α q
P5 >P 6 q>1 >α
P6 >P 4 q> 2
1+α
P4 >P 3 q> 2
1+α
The condition q> 2






To obtain the order of prices stated, overall three conditions are necessary
1. α<1: for monopolistic to be possible
2. αq < 1: for non—drastic innovations to exist
3. 1 <α q 2: two consecutive innovations lead to monopolistic market structure and maximum
three endogenous market structures
2.A.2 Conditions for self—replacement
A monopolist does not self—replace itself if the value of the ﬁrm is lower with innovative R&D
activity than without.
The value of a monopolist without R& D activity is:
Vm =
πm + CmVhom
r + Cm2.A. APPENDIX 83










Figure 2.6: Comparison of costs (continuous line) and beneﬁts (dashed line) of self—replacement
for a monopolist using the paramters considered in the numerical example in the paper.
Instead, the value of the ﬁrm with R&D activity would be:
V RD
m =
πm + CmVhom + ImgV RD
m − aIIm
r + Cm + Im
V RD
m =
πm + CmVhom − aIIm
r + Cm − Im(g − 1)
By using the free entry condition Vhom = aCaI, the condition for no self—replacement is
V RD
m <V m
πm + CmaCaI − aIIm




πm (g − 1) <a I[r + Cm (1 − aC (g − 1))] (2.22)
This condition states that the monopolist does not self—replace itself the lower monopolistic
proﬁts and the higher innovation costs, imitation intensity and the lower imitation costs. We plot
the left hand and right hand side of the equation in ﬁgure 2.6.
The right hand side of equation (2.22) is always larger than the left hand side for the parame-
ters considered in the numerical example in the paper. Hence the monopolist does not self—replace
himself.84 BIBLIOGRAPHY
2.A.3 Optimal innovation and imitation
The value functions for the four diﬀerent types of ﬁrms (monopolist, leader and follower in the



























The speciﬁcation accounts for the quality level k of the intermediate good. With each inno-
vation the output of the intermediate goods increases by the factor q
α
1−α.P r o ﬁts, innovation and
imitation costs increase by the same factor. To obtain stationary values for the ﬁrms in steady





1−αkVe,ω(k),ω = m,het1,het 2,hom.





πhet1 + ChetVhom +( Ihet1 + θIhet2)q
α
1−αVm +( I22 + θI21)q
α
1−αVhet2 − aIIhet1
r + Chet +( 1+θ)(Ihet1 + Ihet2)
Vhet2 =
πhet2 +( Ihet2 + θIhet1)q
α
1−αVhet1 − aIIhet2
r + Chet +( 1+θ)(Ihet1 + Ihet2)
Vhom =
πhom +( Ihomj + θIhom,−j)q
α
1−αVhet1 +( Ihom,−j + θIhom,j)q
α
1−αVhet2 − aIIhomj
r +( 1+θ)(Ihom,j + Ihom,−j)
Firms maximize their value by choosing the innovation intensity, taking other incumbents’
innovative activity and imitation intensity as given. This is the typical setup of an innovation








The best reaction function of the an incumbent is independent of the others’ intensity due to




(1 + θ)πhet2 − (Chet + r)(gVhet1 − aI)
(1 + θ)[g(1 − θ)Vhet1 − aI]
Ihet2 =
(1 + θ)πhet1 − (Chet + r)[g (Vhet1 + θVhet2) − aI]+Chet (1 + θ)Vhom
(1 + θ)[g (1 − θ)(Vhet1 − Vhet2) − aI]
Ihom =
(1 + θ)πhom − r[g (Vhet1 + θVhet2) − aI]
(1 + θ)[g (1 − θ)(Vhet1 − Vhet2) − aI]
By inserting innovation intensities into the value functions and employing the free entry












− π1g2 (1 + θ + gθ)
aI(1 + g + θ)
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The intensity of imitation into the monopolistic market structure is identical to the one into
the heterogeneous setup because any imitation leads to a homogeneous duopoly. With Cm = Chet
innovation intensity simpliﬁes to:
Ihet1 =
(Chet + r)(gVhet1 − aI) − (1 + θ)πhet2
(1 + θ)(aI − (1 − θ)gVhet1)
Ihet2 =
(Chet + r)(gVm + θgVhet2 − aI) − (1 + θ)(ChetVhom + πhet1)
(1 + θ)(aI − (1 − θ)g(Vm − Vhet2)
Ihom =
r(gVhet1 + θgVhet2 − aI) − (1 + θ)πhom
(1 + θ)(aI − (1 − θ)g(Vhet1 − Vhet2)
2.A.4 Steady state market shares
The steady state is obtained when market shares remain constant over time. The conditions for
this are equation (2.20) combined with 1=αm+αhet+αhom. The solution for the market shares
is
αm =
2(1 + θ)Ihom (Ihet1 + θIhet2)
(C + Ihet1 + θIhet2)[C +2 Ihom (1 + θ)]
αhet =
2(1 + θ)CIhom
(C + Ihet1 + θIhet2)[C +2 Ihom (1 + θ)]
αhom =
C
C +2 ( 1+θ)Ihom
From which one can derive table 2.3.86 BIBLIOGRAPHYChapter 3
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3.1 Introduction
This paper addresses the issue of technological diﬀusion in an economy of heterogeneous skills
when technologies are characterized by minimum skill requirements. The endogenous growth
literature identiﬁes innovations as the key feature to promote growth, but their introduction does
not occur instantaneously to the entire population but requires time and resources to completely
diﬀuse in the economy. The S-shaped diﬀusion curves are a stylized fact since Griliches (1957)
for nearly all technologies including General Purpose Technologies, such as electricity and the
semiconductor see David (1991) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005). In addition to time the
process of diﬀusion is not an entirely free process, it requires productive resources in form of
investment, adoption costs or learning time (Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Jovanovic
and Lach (1989)).
Skilled labor plays a double role in the process of technological improvements. In a ﬁrst step
skilled labor is needed to invent new technologies, an activity generally computed in research de-
partments. In a second step, skilled labor is needed to implement new technologies for productive
usage and to further improve it by a process of continuous adaptation. Nelson and Phelps (1966)
relate the speed of adoption to the stock of skilled labor in the economy and postulate that skilled
labor has advantages in innovating and adopting new technologies. This is the reason why ﬁrms
employing a larger share of skilled labor are able to adopt new technologies sooner as found in
the empirical studies by Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Doms et al. (1997).
In the model presented here, a technology is only operable for a worker fulﬁlling the tech-
nology’s minimum skill requirement. This characteristic is an exclusive restriction. Workers are
characterized by heterogeneous skills distributed over a continuous support and instead of workers
engaging in a costly learning process to operate the new technology, it is the technology that is
further improved by purposeful investment to become easier to use. The higher the skill level of
a worker, the earlier she adopts a new technology and, once adopted the new technology, she is
able to improve it further, either by increasing the productivity level or by reducing the minimum
required skill. Higher skilled labor fullﬁlls a double role in the diﬀusion porcess as formulated
by Nelson and Phelps: they are the ones to adopt a technology earlier and at the same time thy
support the diﬀusion process by developing the technology further.
The diﬀusion mechanism combines productivity enhancements and ease of use. For a ﬁrm
owning monopoly rights on the technology lower skill requirements translate into larger market
sizes and increases the proﬁts the monopolist may earn. At the same time, the more productive3.1. INTRODUCTION 89
the technology the more proﬁtable are reductions in the skill level. This mechanism is closely
related to the concept of Directed Technical Change by Acemoglu (1998) by which the sector
with larger market size is favored because it allows to reap higher proﬁts. In our model this
market size is not exogenous, but is endogenously determined through purposeful investment by
the monopolist. Productivity level and minimum skill requirement together determine total proﬁt
and are complementary to one another: the larger the market size, the larger the incentives to
improve the technology.
3.1.1 Stylized Facts
The model shall be applied to the diﬀusion of a General Purpose Technology (GPT), speciﬁcally
the information technology. The main stylized facts regarding the diﬀusion of GPTs have been
collected by David (1991) and more recently by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005). The main
ﬁn d i n g sw ew a n tt or e p r o d u c eh e r ec o n c e n t r a t eo nt h ed i ﬀusion curve and the time length. The
usage of electricity measured as share of total horsepower diﬀused across the productive sector
between 1894 and 1930 in the usual S-shape, that is within 36 years. Regarding the IT sector
diﬀusion is taking place since 1971, when one percent of total capital stock was IT capital. The
onset of adoption by households occurred some years later in form of electric services or personal
computers respectively. We hence focus on time horizons which cover long time spans.
David (1991) unveils a strong co-movement between the diﬀusion pattern of electric motors
and the evolution of labor productivity in the economy. The explanation put forward is twofold.
The ﬁrst obvious reason is that the new technology’s higher productivity inﬂuences the economy—
wide productivity level only insofar the technology has diﬀused, lower diﬀusion rates implies
smaller eﬀects on output. The second reason regards the productivity in the usage of electricity,
the new technology. This does not remain constant after the introduction of the GPT, but
increases slowly with time. Rosenberg (1976) evaluates that productivity gains of an innovation
occur already with the onset of diﬀusion, but more important gains are made along its diﬀusion.
The evolution of wages along the diﬀusion path of electricity and information technology is
very diﬀerent. The recent IT revolution has been characterized by a growing wage diﬀerential
in the U.S. between skilled and less skilled workers. Acemoglu (2002) and Goldin and Katz
(1999) document the college premium in wages to have decreased in the 1970’s and strongly
increased since then. The oﬀered explanations for this phenomenon are directed technical change
by Acemoglu (2002) or alternatively Violante (2002). We are able to generate the growing wage90 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
diﬀerential as a phenomenon due to the diﬀusion process.
3.1.2 Related literature
The leading model in explaining the diﬀusion of General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) has been
developed by Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) distinguishing between the arrival of a GPT
and its practical implementation in an industry. The idea is that a GPT needs a speciﬁcation
for each industry to be implement for the production sector. Two implications earn particular
remarks. The model predicts an immediate downturn of GDP due to the shift from productive
activity to research activity directly following the discovery of the GPT. This is at odds with
the observations by David (1991) that a new GPT requires some years to have macroeconomic
eﬀects. The second fact is that research activity itself only makes up a small fraction of total
employment, it is therefore diﬃcult to imagine that the sector may generate sizeable slumps
in GDP. But nevertheless it is important to notice that the introduction of a GPT leads to the
deviation of resources from purely productive activities to adoption activities in some form, which
is foregone output.
On the basis of Helpman and Trajtenberg’s model Aghion and Howitt (1998b) introduces the
notion of social learning, leading to an epidemic diﬀu s i o np a t t e r no fG P T .S o c i a ll e a r n i n gc o n s i s t s
of agents observing other agents already using the new technology. The number of agents met
is constant over time, but the probability that these agents have adopted the technology under
the condition that oneself has not, decreases over time. The model foresees three steps: the
arrival of the GPT, cost—free discovery or observation of templates and the implementation in
the corresponding sector. The main shortfall of the model is the exogenous and cost-free process of
diﬀusion disregarding of agent’s behavior. Our diﬀu s i o np r o c e s si n s t e a di sd r i v e nb yap u r p o s e f u l
investment activity of a monopolist into the characteristics of the technology.
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) develop a model which uses learning at the plant level as
main driving force for productivity gains and adoption incentives. In addition, the productivity
gains are exclusively achieved by skilled workers as we lay it out as well. Our model is more
stylized than the one by Greenwood and Yorukoglu, and the main diﬀerence is that in our model
adoption costs are entirely incurred by the side oﬀering the technology in form of development
costs instead of the workers. This is already suﬃcient to obtain an S-shaped diﬀusion curve and
productivity increments along diﬀusion.
Most models focus on mechanisms on the adopter’s side when analyzing diﬀusion. To generate3.2. THE MODEL 91
either S-shaped diﬀusion curves or discrete moments of technology switching these models include
the learning—by—doing model by Parente (1994), informational models such as Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1996) or epidemic models such as Aghion and Howitt (1998b) or training costs. In this
model, similar to the one by Mukoyama (2004), we focus on the supply side. It is the innovating
R&D sector which subsequently improves the performance of the technology or its usability for
workers. In this sense the paper is complementary to the demand driven diﬀusion.
Similar to Mukoyama (2004) we use the concept of minimum skill requirements for operating a
technology, but place the diﬀusion of new technologies in a general equilibrium model which allows
for less stringent assumptions. The diﬀusion process in the model by Mukoyama (2004) is heavily
based on the exogenous skill distribution in the population. With a log—normal distribution curve
he obtains the S-shaped diﬀusion curve which would be linearly shaped when using a uniform
distribution of skills.
We present a model which generates an S-shaped diﬀusion curve without this being primarily
dependent on the distribution of skills in the economy, although a single—peaked skill distribution
would reinforce the logistic character of the diﬀusion process. For this eﬀect to take place it is
essential that the costs for reducing the skill requirements are convex and that the development
is constrained in ﬁnding workers who can already use the new technology. In this way slower
diﬀusion takes place at the early stage. In addition, if the technology’s productivity improves
along diﬀusion and workers’ wages are related to this, development costs increase along diﬀusion.
we are able to reproduce in a stylized way the diﬀusion of the information technology and show
that productivity improvements and diﬀusion reinforce each other as the technology matures.
3.2 The Model
The economy consists of three sectors, a ﬁnal goods sector producing a homogeneous good, an
intermediate goods sector consisting of a continuum of industries operating monopolistically and
employing labor, and an R&D sector innovating new technologies and improving existing ones
using suﬃciently skilled labor.
The ﬁnal goods sector aggregates output from intermediate ﬁrms to a ﬁnal homogenous output
good by a Dixit—Stiglitz aggregator. Firms in the intermediate sector have the choice of two
technologies, either to employ a mature technology usable by any worker in the economy or a
new technology operable only by suﬃciently skilled workers. The technologies are characterized by
two parameters, productivity level and level of skill requirement. The ﬁrst parameter determines92 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
output per worker while the second is a parameter determining the availability of a technology
to workers of diﬀerent skills. We follow Aghion and Howitt (1998a) in the setup of ﬁnal and
intermediate goods production.
The R&D sector accomplishes three tasks, innovation of new technologies, productivity en-
hancement and reduction of skill requirements for existing technologies. Only workers with the
ability to use the new technology are employed in the R&D sector, i.e. workers that have al-
ready adopted the new technology. Labor is allocated between the intermediate sector and the
R&D sector by an arbitrage condition for wage. We will use the terms skilled/unskilled workers
equivalently to the terms adopters/non—adopters.
3.2.1 Goods sector
Final goods
The ﬁnal goods production is characterized using a continuum of intermediate goods x(i) char-








.( 3 . 1 )
Firms in the sector aggregate the quality—weighted output of the intermediate sector using a Dixit—
Stiglitz aggregator with elasticity α. We assume that there exist two diﬀerent technologies, H and
L, with which the production sector may operate with productivities AH and AL characterizing
high and low productivity level, respectively. Workers in the intermediate sector employ either
one of the two technologies, conditioning on the skill requirement of the technology and the
skill level of the worker. We assume a continuous skill distribution for workers F (θ) with skill
parameter θ [0;1]. The high technology is operated by workers with skill levels larger or equal to
the skill requirement of the technology θ > θit, wile those workers with a lower skill level operate
the lower technology. Hence, the population is divided into two groups, those workers that have
adopted the new technology, 1 − F(θit), and those that have not adopted it yet, F(θit).T h e
two groups are only divided with respect to the technology they use, their skill level does not
aﬀect their productivity. Furthermore, not all skilled workers are available for production in the
intermediate sector, a share nt is employed in the R&D sector and therefore not all industries are
active in the intermediate sector and ﬁnal goods production is aggregated over a smaller number














yt = Yt/ALt =[ F (θit)xLt
α + ρα
t [1 − F (θit) − nt]xHt
α]
1/α . (3.2)
The production employs productivity—weighted output from the intermediate sector originating
from the two types of technology. The share F (θit) of intermediate ﬁrms employs the low produc-
tive technology with lower skilled workers, and [1 − F (θit) − nt] employs the new technology with
higher skilled workers. nt characterizes the share of adopters employed in the R&D sector, which
are not available for intermediate goods production. The second line rewrites the production
function as output in eﬃciency units based on the productivity level of the mature technol-
ogy: yt ≡ Yt/AL,t,w h e r eρt characterizes the relative productivity between the two technologies
ρt = AHt/ALt.
Firms in the ﬁnal sector are competitive and demand their inputs from the intermediate
sector. The amount is determined by proﬁt maximization maxx[Yt − p(i)x(i)] and we obtain
with Shephard’s Lemma that the price of inputs equals their marginal product p(i)=∂Y/∂x(i).
The inverse demand function for the goods of the two types of technologies L, H relative to the
























where xL,x H is the quantity demanded from intermediate ﬁrms using the old or the new tech-
nology, respectively.
Intermediate goods
T h es e c t o ro fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d su s e sal i n e a rproduction function with labor and operates
monopolistically within the sector i
x(i)=L(i). (3.4)
The production of high technology goods is possible only for workers with worker skills larger
than the skill requirement of the technology, i,e, when θ > θit, while workers with low skills are
precluded from the possibility to use the new technology. Firms in the intermediate sector are
1In order to ease reading we drop the time subscript when it does not represent any source of confusion.94 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
therefore subdivided by their operating technology into two groups, employing either workers
having adopted the new technology or not. Along the diﬀusion path of a new technology the
R&D sector reduces skill requirements and the number of users increases as technology matures.
The demand for intermediate goods originates from the ﬁnal goods sector. The intermediate
sector maximizes proﬁts with respect to quantities taking into account the inverse demand (3.3)
by the ﬁnal goods sector.
πint
i =a r gm a x
x(i)
[p[x(i)]x(i) − w(i)x(i)], (3.5)





Prices are a markup over marginal labor costs. Combining the inverse demand (3.3) with equation















where ωL ≡ wL/AL and ωH ≡ wH/AL are wages relative to the lower technologies productivity
level. Inserting prices and quantities into equation (3.5) for proﬁt maximization and using the
production function in the intermediate sector (3.4) we obtain proﬁts for each intermediate ﬁrm
either using the low or the high technology.
πint
L =( 1 − α)LαY 1−α (3.9)
πint
H = ρα (1 − α)LαY 1−α. (3.10)
Proﬁts of intermediate ﬁrms depend on total output as well as the technological level of pro-
duction. These proﬁts by the intermediate sector are used to rent a production licence from
the R&D sector for either technology. An intermediate ﬁrm is prepared to pay up to its entire
proﬁts to obtain a licence to use the production technology. Every period the R&D sector rents
a production licence for the low and high productive technology to all ﬁrms in the intermediate
sector. Depending on the skill level of its workers, the intermediate ﬁrm demands either a licence
for the low or the high technology and total proﬁts of intermediate ﬁrms dedicated to licences is3.2. THE MODEL 95












H =[ 1− F (θi) − n](1− α)y1−αρα
We normalize labor in each industry to 1,a n dF (θi) of ﬁrms acquire licence for the low technology,
while a share [1 − F (θi) − n] uses the new technology, with n being the share of workers in the
R&D sector. The relative total proﬁts of ﬁrms with the two technologies depend on the relative










= ρα1 − F (θi) − n
F (θi)
(3.11)
Proﬁts of intermediate ﬁrms are entirely used for the purchase of licences in equilibrium and
represent revenues for R&D ﬁrms. The relative revenues for the R&D sector oﬀering either one
or the other technology depends positively on the relative productivity of the two technologies
and the market size of these. Acemoglu (1998) introduced directed technical change stating that
there is a market size eﬀect for research activity. The larger one sector, the more proﬁtable is
innovation within this sector. The R&D activity in this model can take two forms for a given
technology, R&D enhances productivity or it reduces the minimum skill requirement. Depending
on which activity is more proﬁtable to increase total revenues, the R&D sector allocates resources
either in one or the other activity.
Resource constraint and wages
Before presenting the R&D sector, we consider the resource constraint and wages in the economy.
The economy is endowed with 1 of labor, employed in the R&D sector and either in high or
low quality goods production in the intermediate sector, LH or LL respectively. Labor in the
research sector is employed either for productivity enhancements LP, reduction of the minimum
skill requirement Lθ or for the innovation of new technologies LI.
1=LL + LH + LP + Lθ + LI
The labor market is strictly segmented between the two skill groups but operates within each skill
group competitively, skilled and unskilled workers are paid their marginal product. We assume
that workers who have the choice of adopting (those with a skill level equal or higher than the skill
requirement θ > θi) adopt the new technology if wages paid with the new technology are equal96 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
or higher than with the old technology. By dividing the labor force in the productive sector into
adopters and non—adopters we obtain LL = F (θi) and LH =[ 1− F (θi) − nP − nθ − nI],w h e r e
nP,n θ,n I represent the share of the labor force employed in the respective research activities.
The equations for labor demand in the high and low technology sectors (3.7), (3.8), combined
with the production function in the intermediate sector obtains a reformulation of the ﬁnal goods
production function (3.2).2
y = {F(θi)+( 1− F(θi) − nP − nθ − nI)ρα}
1/α (3.12)
Final good production depends on the relative size of the skilled and unskilled labor force as well
as the relative productivity ρ of the new technology. Production of ﬁnal goods decreases with
the amount of workers in the research and development sector, ∂y/∂n < 0. The minimum skill
requirement of the new technology θi determines the share of adopters and non-adopters, and
if the two technologies have diﬀering productivities this aﬀects also total output. A lower skill
requirement of the new technology leads to higher output in the ﬁnal sector ∂y/∂θi < 0.
Relative wages of workers using the two technologies are obtained by combining the equations
on the amount of labor employed with the two technologies, equations (3.7), (3.8).
ωL = αy1−α (3.13)




Wages are aﬀected by total output and the relative productivity ρ. Output in the ﬁnal goods
sector, in turn, is directly inﬂuenced the relative technological level with ∂y/∂ρ > 0.T h er e l a t i v e
wage, instead, is determined exclusively by the relative productivity of the two sectors ρ =
AH/AL. In addition, ﬁnal output production depends on the share of workers using the new
technology taking into account that some of them are employed in the ﬁnal goods sector. The
larger the size of the research sector, the lower are wages due to the fact that total output
decreases.
2One unit of labor produces one unit of intermediate goods. Due to the normalization of labor and the distribtion
of industries on [0,1], every sector requires 1 unit of labor.3.2. THE MODEL 97
3.2.2 The Research and Development sector
The R&D sector is divided into three activities. It innovates new technologies, improves exist-
ing technologies and reduces the required skills for them. It uses as input for all tasks labor
that already adopted the newest technology and pays an identical wage to the high technology
productive sector (arbitrage condition).
The innovative activity is characterized by free entry similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992)
with labor determined in general equilibrium. We consider this research as basic research for
a new technology and the patent on the discovered technology is sold to a ﬁrm developing the
technology further by augmenting productivity and reducing skill requirements. In turn, the
developing ﬁrm rents out production licences to the intermediate goods sector as seen before.
We deﬁne some variables: new technologies are innovated with productivity Ait = bi and skill
requirement θi.W ec a l lbi the technological level of the product which remains ﬁxed throughout
time while its productivity Ai increases thanks to productivity enhancing R&D activity. The
relative productivity level, i.e. the productivity level compared to its initial level is denoted by
ρi = Ai/bi.T h e skill requirement θi is an exclusion restriction for usage of the technology.
Workers are distributed exogenously along a single—dimensional skill variable with cumulative
distribution function F(θ). All workers with skills higher than θi (θ ≥ θi) may use the technology
to produce the intermediate good, while all those with less skills can not. A higher θi of the
technology requires higher skills from the worker, which translates into a smaller market size.
Innovation
The main task of the research sector is to innovate new technologies with a higher technological
level than the current best technology. We follow Aghion and Howitt (1992) in the incentive
structure of innovations. The research sector employs labor that has already adopted the latest
production technology and each worker innovates the new technology with a Poisson probability
of λ. The costs of innovation are labor costs wH and the beneﬁts are the expected value of
all future proﬁts from the developing ﬁrm that buys the patent rights from the innovator. The
market for innovations is characterized by free entry, and the research arbitrage condition can be
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where the value of the new technology i +1depends on the technological level bi+1,t h er e l a t i v e
productivity ρi+1 and its initial skill requirement θi+1. In addition to its new technological level,
the new technology requires higher skills θi+1 >θ i, which restricts the number of potential users
similar to Mukoyama (2004). Even if the new technological level bi+1 is identical to the current
productivity level Ai the required skills are larger and the size of population using the technology
is smaller. We assume that a new innovation requires skills that are an increasing function of
the currently operated technology, θi+1 = g(θi),w i t hg0(θi) > 0.A sl o n ga st h es k i l lr e q u i r e m e n t
is larger than the maximum skill level in the population θi+1 > ¯ θj, no innovative activity takes
place as no worker would be able to operate the new technology, i.e. V (·,·,¯ θi+1)=0 .
The level of skill requirements for the next technology is independent of its productivity and
independent of the productivity of the current best technology. As a consequence, higher skill
requirements of a new technology decreases the value of an innovation ∂V (bi,ρ i,θi)/∂θi < 0 and
through the skill link between current and next technology g(·), innovative activity increases as
the current technology diﬀuses in the economy.
A new technology starts with the productivity level Ai+1, equal to its technological level
Ai+1 = bi+1. The relative productivity level is hence 1
¡
ρi+1 = Ai+1/bi+1 =1
¢
.W ec a nr e w r i t e





ωH = λγi+1v(1,g(θi)) (3.16)
with ωH = wH/bi and γi+1 = bi+1/bi used in the second equation. Moreover, the arguments
of the value function in intensive form have been substituted by their values at the moment of
innovation related to the characteristics of the current technology, ρi+1 =1and θi+1 = g (θi).
Productivity enhancement
The development sector invests in productivity enhancements of the active technologies by using
labor from the pool of skilled workers, those that have already adopted the new technology.
Only these workers are able to improve the technology because non-adopters, not being able to
use it, cannot improve it. The technology for improving the current technology from relative
productivity ρ to ρ0 >ρnext period may be expressed in terms of labor requirement LP3.2. THE MODEL 99
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where ρi represents the current productivity level of the technology compared to its initial level,
aP the productivity of the productivity enhancement technology, and φP > 1 determines the
degree of decreasing returns in the activity. Improving the productivity of a technology is more
labor consuming the larger its current productivity relative to its technology, i.e. the larger ρi.
The labor costs for productivity enhancements consist of the amount of labor employed multi-
plied by the wage rate, here expressed in intensive variables, ωH = wH/bi. With the productivity















where ωH is the wage of skilled labor in intensive units and LP is labor employed for productivity
enhancement. The cost function is proportional to wages, increasing in the productivity advances
already made ρi, and convex in the step size of the productivity increase ρ0
i − ρi.T h e f a c t
that improvements are more costly the higher productivity levels already are, ensures a slower
productivity growth the maturer the technology becomes, and convex costs in the productivity
step size make fast productivity gains costly. The wage rate for skilled labor is entirely determined
by the productive sector of intermediate goods. They change with the productivity advances the
R&D sector generates.
The revenue for ﬁrms in the R&D sector are the proﬁts of intermediate ﬁr m sa si n(3.10).
T h ei n t e r m e d i a t ep r o ﬁts are entirely captured by renting production licences to the ﬁrms in that
sector, where the price for the licence depends proportionally on the productivity level ρi of the
technology and the market size is determined by the skill requirement.
Reduction of skill requirement
Next to the productivity increments the ﬁrm in the development sector expands the number of
potential users of the technology by reducing the skill requirement for the technology. Every
reduction in skills enlarges the market size but leaves the technology’s productivity unaﬀected.
The reduction is induced by purposeful R&D activity carried out by workers who already produce
with the technology. The improvements are made in discrete time and are characterized by a
technology with decreasing returns to labor intensity based on the current level of skill requirement100 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
θi. The speciﬁcation for the skill—reduction technology takes the form
θ0
i = θi − aθL
1/φθ
θ , (3.19)
where θi and θ
0
i represent the current and next period’s skill requirement, aθ is the productivity
of the R&D sector in skill-reducing activity and φθ > 1 reﬂects the degree of decreasing returns














The costs are convex in the size of skill reduction and vary with the wage rate ωH of skilled labor
in the productive sector. The beneﬁts for the R&D sector reducing the skill requirement is to
enlarge the number of workers using the technology. The two activities of the development sector
generate higher proﬁts for those ﬁrms due to higher productivities of the technology or a larger
market size. The costs for either activity depend on the level of wages in the productive sector
and increase along the diﬀusion path.
3.3 Value functions
With the R&D sector and the goods sector described above we focus on the recursive optimization
problem by the developing ﬁrms using value functions. For this, we simplify the setup of the model
and speciﬁcally address the diﬀusion of a General Purpose Technology (GPT). Such a technology
ﬁts the described setup best because it is a single technology applicable transversally to all sectors.
We assume that maximum two technologies coexist at each point in time and that the discovery
of the GPT occurs only after the former technology has completely diﬀused. This means, the
old GPT is denoted by i − 1 and complete diﬀusion implies θi−1 =0 , such that all workers are
able to use the technology. This assures also that older technologies i − 2,i − 3,...have become
obsolete (GPT i − 1 has highest technology in comparison to all the others). The new GPT i is
characterized by a minimum required skill level of θi at its introduction.
Regarding productivity, we assume that the improvements have halted for the old GPT be-
cause the decreasing returns in this activity make it no longer proﬁtable, hence ρ0
i − ρi =0 .B u t
the ﬁrms in the R&D sector holding the patents for GPT i reaps the proﬁts without improving
the technology. At the introduction of the new GPT its productivity is identical to the old one,
i.e. bi = pi−1 = ρi−1bi−1, and obviously the relative productivity is 1, ρi = Ai/bi =1 . Finally,3.3. VALUE FUNCTIONS 101
the introduction of a subsequent GPT i+1can not occur during the diﬀusion of the actual tech-
nology i, implying that labor is not employed in the innovative R&D activity, nI =0 .A l lt h e s e
assumptions are made to analyze the diﬀusion of a GPT without the inﬂuence of other factors.
The problem of the monopolistic ﬁrm developing the new technology either by improving the
productivity or by reducing skills and the one owning the patent of the low technology can be
expressed by































An R&D ﬁrm owning the patent for the high technology with technological level bi,r e l a t i v e
productivity ρi and skill requirement θi maximizes its value by choosing next period’s productivity
level and the level of skill requirement subject to the cost functions (3.18) and (3.20).The patent
holder of the old technology, instead, has no maximization problem to solve, but earns the renting
price for the licence ΠRD
L .B o t hﬁrms discount the future with the factor β<1. The proﬁts of
















1 − F (θi) − nθi − nρi
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from renting out the production licences to the share
of intermediate ﬁrms operating with the high or low technology respectively, subtracted by any
development costs used for their improvement. Total revenues for the high technology derive
from the share of ﬁrms employing suﬃciently skilled workers (1 − F(θi) − np,i − nθ,i) reduced
by the costs for productivity enhancements and skill reduction, CP,C θ respectively. Note that
these costs depend on wages which are determined in general equilibrium. Earnings for the low
technology licence derives from the share of ﬁrms using the old technology F (θi) multiplied by
the proﬁts of a single ﬁrm in the intermediate sector.
By rewriting wH = biωH and using equation (3.9) and (3.10) in intensive form, i.e. normalized





















L (θi). Similarly the cost functions can be102 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
expressed by wages relative to the technological level bi, wH = biωH:
πRD









=( 1 − F (θi) − nθ − nρ)πint


























where the cost functions for development activity (3.18) and (3.20) have been inserted and also
output is expressed relative to the technological level, y = Y/bi.
Employing the proﬁt functions in intensive form allows also to rewrite the value functions in
intensive form and reduce the number of state variables.

























The value functions simplify substantially and are characterized by only two state variables,
relative productivity and skill requirement. These functions are identical for any technological
level bi, though the value of each ﬁrm holding a patent changes with the technological level bi.
The proﬁts by intermediate ﬁrms πint
H and πint
L are given by equations (3.10) and (3.10),a n dw e
have assumed L =1 , wages in intensive form ωH of adopters are the marginal product of ﬁrms
in the intermediate the sector using the new technology as in equation (3.14).
3.4 Analytical results
Having set up the cost functions for R&D activity and the value functions for ﬁrms in the
development sector, we may generate a ﬁrst result regarding improvements in productivity and
skill reduction. The size of productivity improvements increases with the market size for the
technology.
In order to show this, we simplify the setup further and assume that the monopolist improves
the productivity level of the technology only once, and the minimum required skill level is taken
as given3.T h eﬁrm value of equation (3.23) depends on the inﬁnite discounted ﬂow of proﬁtf r o m
3The ﬁrm hence optimizes only w.r.t. to the productivity level. In addition we disregard the general equilibrium
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intermediate ﬁrms. As the productivity increase occurs only once and the required skill level is












































The ﬁr s tl i n ee x p r e s s e st h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm divided into current and future proﬁts. Future per—
period proﬁts are constant with a ﬁxed share of ﬁrms [1 − F (θi)] using the new technology and
a constant productivity level of ρ0
i. The second line replaces the cost function for productivity

















where the left hand side represents costs of improving the technology from ρi to ρ0
i, which consist
of the foregone proﬁts due to smaller market size and the labor costs. The right hand side
represents future proﬁts with higher productivity ρ
0
i. The development costs are independent of
the minimum required skill level θi, while the beneﬁts on the right hand side do depend on the
size of the market [1 − F (θi)],w i t hF0 (θi) > 0.Ah i g h e rθi, i.e. a higher minimum skill level,
reduces the beneﬁts of an innovation and consequently incentives for productivity enhancements
increase with the market size. There is hence a complementarity between productivity growth
and market size. Noting that the market size of the new technology is negatively related to the
market size of the old technology we can interpret this as the eﬀect of directed technical change:
the larger the number of intermediate ﬁrms of a given technology, the larger the investment in
productivity increments by the monopolist.
Next to the market size mechanism, the ﬁrst order condition (3.24) reﬂects also the decreasing
returns to productivity improvements. A higher level of productivity ρi increases costs on the
left hand side for given θi without direct compensation on the side of gains. As a consequence
the developing ﬁrm reduces the step size (ρ0
i − ρi) of productivity enhancements the further the
technology has matured.
3.5 Numerical results
The two analytical results obtained before will be encountered again in the numerical example
presented here. To recapitulate, productivity improvements increase with market size, but de-
crease with the productivity level already reached. The numerical exercise intends to mimic the104 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
diﬀusion of IT technology which started in 1971 when using the deﬁnition by Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2005)4.
For the numerical example we use the following parameterization
α 0.7 elasticity of substitution between interm. goods
β 0.9 discount rate
aP 0.12 cost factor productivity increments
aθ 0.18 cost factor skill requirements
φP 2 cost convexity of productivity requirements
φθ 2 cost convexity of skill increments
F(θi) θi uniform skill distribution
Table 3.1: Numerical values for the parameters in the model
α represents the degree of substitutability between the goods of the intermediate industries in
the ﬁnal good sector and 1/α is the mark-up over wages for the intermediate sector. β represents
the yearly discount factor, set to lead to an internal rate of return to investment of 10%. As
am a j o rd i ﬀerence to Mukoyama (2004) we assume a uniform distribution of skills F(θi) in the
population. We use such a distribution in order to abstract from possible inﬂuences of single
peaked distributions such as the frequently used lognormal distribution. The eﬀects in this
model do not rely on the speciﬁc form of the distribution function but are generated through the
endogenous interactions between productivity enhancements and skill reduction in the model.
φP and φθ have been chosen to generate quadratic costs for productivity increments and skill
reduction and the cost parameters of the development sector aθ and aP are chosen to obtain a
diﬀusion time which is similar to the one of the two GPTs, electricity (36 years) and IT (since
1971).
We solve the numerical problem by value function iteration with a support for skills θ [0,1]
and a support for productivity ρ [1,2.2].
3.5.1 S-shaped diﬀusion curve and productivity gains
The numerical results unveil the interconnection of market size and productivity improve-
4In order to compare the two General Purpose technologies electricity and IT the authors use as starting date
of difussion, the moment at which one percent of total capital in the US economy was IT capital, which was 1971.3.5. NUMERICAL RESULTS 105
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Labor employed in skill reduction (bold) and productivity enhancement (dashed)
Figure 3.1: The evolution of diﬀerent variables along the diﬀusion path over a time horizon of 70
years. Diﬀusion occurs S-shaped, productivity increases continuously and only slows down when
the technology has completely diﬀused. Skill—reduction is occurs in the ﬁrst 35 years, productivity
enhancements occur on a longer horizon.106 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
ments. The new technology diﬀuses in an S-shaped manner even though we are assuming a
uniform distribution of skills in the population. Single peaked distributions such as the normal
or lognormal distribution would lead to variations in the exact form of the diﬀusion path, but
does not change its S-shaped characteristic. The shape of the diﬀusion curve is determined by
two diﬀerent eﬀects at the beginning and at the end of diﬀusion. The slow ontake is achieved
by the resource constraint of skilled labor with small market size for the technology. A young
technology is only known to few workers, as a consequence only few workers can be employed in
the development sector to decrease the minimum skill requirement. At the same time only few
intermediate ﬁrms can operate with the new technology which reﬂects a small market size for
the technology and hence only small per—period proﬁts for the developing ﬁrm. As the number
of adopting workers increases, proﬁts increase, development is no longer labor constraint and
the speed of diﬀusion increases. Once the technology has diﬀused to part of the population the
productivity is also enhanced.
Comparing the costs for skill reduction at early and later stages reveals that labor costs
increase as the productivity of adopters in the intermediate sector increases and the developing
sector needs to oﬀer similar wages. This induces ﬁrms to reduce the step size as for skill reduction
as the technology matures (note that the cost function for the step size is quadratic). The S-shaped
diﬀusion curve is hence obtained, not from a speciﬁc distribution of skills in the economy, but
through the interplay of little skilled labor and low market size at the beginning and increasingly
expensive diﬀusion costs at the mature stage of the technology.
Regarding the evolution of productivity, it does not increase directly with the introduction of
the technology. Only once the technology has suﬃciently diﬀused it becomes proﬁtable for the ﬁrm
to invest in productivity enhancement. Their beneﬁts increase with the diﬀusion of the technology
due to its larger market size which is especially visible during the early stages of diﬀusion. The
lower the skill requirement the larger become the incentives to increase the productivity and
hence the ﬁrm invests more into the development of productivity. With the maturing and the
complete diﬀusion also productivity growth slows down due to the fact that it becomes more
and more diﬃcult to further improve the technology. Two elements characterize the productivity
evolution, at early stages it is strongly conditioned by the market size complementarity, while at
later stages the increased costs to improve a mature technology slow down productivity gains.
These explanations show that productivity increments strongly depend on the diﬀusion level
of the technology and at the same time, the exact diﬀusion pattern hinges on the improvements3.5. NUMERICAL RESULTS 107













Figure 3.2: Evolution of ﬁnal good production along the diﬀusion path. The slump is due to a
large number working in the development sector improving the new technology.
in productivity.
3.5.2 Final production output
Output of ﬁn a lg o o d sa sd e ﬁned in (3.1) is inﬂuenced by the productivities of the two technologies
employed, the degree of diﬀusion of the new technology and the share of population employed
in the development sector. The larger the productivity and the lower the skill requirement of
the new technology the larger is the output level of the ﬁnal good. In addition the share of
workers employed in the development sector negatively aﬀects output and reduces the number of
operative industries, which in turn has eﬀects on the proﬁt level of R&D ﬁrms.‘i‘
The numerical exercise shows that the small R&D activity at the beginning of the diﬀusion
process leaves the level of total output unaltered and only with the increase in R&D activity more
labor is diverted from the productive sector to the development sector inducing a slump in ﬁnal108 CHAPTER 3. INNOVATIONS AND DIFFUSION
output. With the productivity increase and the reduction in development activity ﬁnal output
recovers and picks up growth. As the technology matures growth slows down and eventually it
becomes too costly to improve the GPT further leading to a halt in growth. We observe the
lowest levels of production after 8—9 years after the introduction if the GPT, which is roughly the
time frame of the information technology covering the late seventies and beginning of the eighties
.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a foundation for diﬀusion processes with ﬁrms holding rights on a general
purpose technology by combining investment decisions in productivity improvements and market
size. The diﬀusion of new technologies and their central role in the growth process has been
described in general terms by Rosenberg (1976) and speciﬁcally for General Purpose Technologies
by David (1991) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005). A striking feature is the timely process
for technologies to diﬀuse and the contemporaneous gains in productivity that accompanies this
process. In this paper we were able to reproduce some of the stylized facts and generate the
a mechanism by which the degree of diﬀusion and the productivity level are complementary to
each other. The technology gains in productivity the more it has diﬀused and the larger the
productivity the faster it diﬀuses. This is due to the fact that proﬁts for the developing ﬁrm
increase with market size and the productivity level.
The combined assumption of productivity increments with the restriction that only adopters
may further improve the technology leads to an S-shaped diﬀusion curve. It is therefore not neces-
sary to assume a speciﬁc skill distribution within the population, but a single peaked distribution
such as a normal or lognormal distribution further enforces the S-shaped pattern.
Applying the setup to the diﬀusion of IT, the numerical example is able to reﬂect the long—run
diﬀusion pattern of a General Purpose Technology which requires more than 30 years. Produc-
tivity gains to the are slow at the beginning, gain momentum and decrease again as diﬀusion is
completed, but nevertheless the productivity gains continue for a long horizon.
This model is evidently only a stylized version, the diﬀusion of a GPT implies continuous
innovation as well as a much richer a pattern of entry and exit of ﬁrms along the path, instead of
being controlled by a single monopolist as assumed here. In addition, this model does not consider
issues regarding the problems of adoption and their costs on the demand side. But nevertheless
it allows to unveil the complementarity between diﬀusion and productivity improvements.Bibliography
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